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This thesis focuses on three different empirical questions related to the economic in-
centives to the formation of identity.
The first chapter examines the dynamics of occupational segregation of self-identified
homosexual workers, specifically accounting for the fact that part of their observed
distribution may come from selective disclosure of sexual identity. We present a
simple labour supply model where individuals choose both an occupation and their
revealed sexual identity. Using confidential data from the UK, we show that self-
reported homosexuals are concentrated in opposite gender typical occupations. As
tolerance increases, a greater fraction of homosexuals reports their homosexual iden-
tity, particularly in marginal homosexual occupations, hence occupational segregation
falls. The finding suggests that part of the observed segregation of homosexuals in
opposite sex occupations is due to selective disclosure rather tastes or comparative
advantage.
The second chapter uses an original dataset covering the universe of local elections in
England spanning over 40 years to investigate whether the electoral success of women
and ethnic minorities leads to increases in these groups’ representation as political
candidates in subsequent elections. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find
that both groups enjoy a personal incumbency advantage. One direct consequence
is an increase in the fraction of women and ethnic minority candidates contesting a
seat previously held by someone from the same group. In the case of women, this
increase is also driven by an inflow of new women candidates.
The third chapter focuses on the impact of television on religious identity. We use
detailed survey data on individuals’ self-reported religious sentiment, behaviours and
attitudes from Indonesia. We use the variation in signal reception due to geographic
topography at the sub-district level to estimate the causal effect of media exposure.
Individuals exposed to a higher number of television channels are less likely to report
being religious and following religious practices. Furthermore, they also display lower
interfaith hostility. At the village level, higher exposure to television increases the
supply of religiously forbidden activities. However, higher exposure to television
seems to have no effect on political preferences.
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Chapter 1
Homosexuals’ Segregation in the
Labour Market: Occupational
Choice and Selective Disclosure
1.1 Introduction
Labour force segregation is still entrenched in modern labour markets. The economic
literature highlights how individuals unevenly distribute across firms, jobs, occupa-
tions and industries along gender, ethnic background, nationality and other demo-
graphic characteristics (Carrington and Troske (1998), (Hellerstein and Neumark,
2008), Blau et al. (2013), Goldin (2014a)). The key consequence of labour mar-
ket segregation is segregation of pay structures and enduring differentials in earning
between groups, often to the detriment of already disadvantaged groups. In con-
trast to the literature on gender and racial discrimination, labour market segregation
of homosexual workers is still largely unexplored. Little is known about how self-
identified homosexuals distribute across jobs and whether this is due to a disclosure
effect (only individuals in certain jobs declare themselves to be homosexuals) or oc-
cupational choices. This is particularly relevant in a context of persistent high stigma
against homosexuals (Stonewall (2013), Stonewall (2017)).
This paper explores the dynamics of occupational segregation by sexual orien-
tation when society discriminates against homosexuals. More specifically, it assesses
1
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whether the observed patterns of segregation are consistent with predictions from
a Roy-type model of occupational choice where individuals selectively disclose their
sexual identity to avoid discrimination at the workplace. Learning about how occu-
pational segregation is shaped by discrimination allows us to understand better why
occupational segregation along sexual identity lines persists today, an observation
which has been shown to have an important role in explaining the wage gap between
homosexual and heterosexual workers (Badgett (1995), Black et al. (2003), Blandford
(2003), Plug and Berkhout (2004)).
In the first part of the paper we present the model. The model is justified by
two stylised facts. First, empirical evidence shows that self-identified homosexual
workers tend to work in gender-atypical jobs, i.e. jobs in which the opposite gender
is predominant. Second, homosexual identity is likely to be selectively disclosed to
avoid stigma and discrimination. As a consequence, the distribution of homosexuals
across jobs can be influenced by the different costs that come with self-identifying as
homosexual across occupations. The paper tries to shed light on the determinants of
reporting a homosexual identity at the workplace by bringing these elements into a
unified labour supply model in the spirit of a Roy’s model of occupational choice (Roy
(1951), Heckman and Honore (1990)). In this model, homosexuals are a minority in
society and are discriminated against. Latent homosexuals and heterosexuals self-
select into occupations based on preferences and costs, including discrimination, that
can vary across occupations. Consistent with the observed patterns in the data,
the model assumes that the costs of entering (or the distaste for) an occupation is
higher the more gender typical the occupation is. The model is enriched by allowing
individuals to selectively report their sexual identity. In the spirit of Akerlof and
Kranton’s (2000) model of identity, individuals can conceal their sexual identity. This
has benefits if homosexuals are discriminated against; hence, latent homosexuals can
escape the penalty that society imposes on them by adopting a heterosexual identity.
However, it also entails a cost, as the violation of one’s sense of self comes with a
utility loss. One important feature of the model is that endogenising self-reported
sexual identity allows us to derive implications for the distribution not only of latent,
but also of self-reported homosexual and heterosexual identities in society. This is a
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major advantage of the model, as only self-reported identities can be observed in the
data.
The major prediction of the model is that, as society becomes more tolerant
towards homosexuals, a greater fraction of individuals will report their latent ho-
mosexual identity. More importantly, the model shows that as tolerance increases,
occupational segregation of self-reported homosexuals will fall, because self-identified
homosexuals will be increasingly less segregated into gender atypical occupations.
This mechanism is driven by selective disclosure of individuals in marginal (less and
less gender atypical) occupations.
In the second part of the paper, we bring the model to the data. We use con-
fidential data on around 1 million individuals from the UK Integrated Household
Survey that reports - among others - individuals’ self reported sexual identity to-
gether with information on socio-economic characteristics, including very detailed
information on occupation (but unfortunately no data on wages1) over the course of
five years. This data allows us to identify large samples of self-identifing homosexual
individuals workers - about 4,300 men and 3,000 women. This sample is considerably
larger than other studies that have used individual-level sexual identity information
in the United Kingdom (Aksoy et al. (2018), Bryson (2016), Frank (2006), Arab-
sheibani et al. (2005)). We exploit cross sectional variation across very localised area
to test the implications of the model. This is possible because the confidential version
of the data we use provides very detailed information on individuals’ geographical
residence (the 379 local authorities in Great Britain). Consistent with the model, the
empirical analysis finds that local tolerance increases the fraction of workers who self-
identify as homosexuals and it lowers occupational segregation along sexual identity
lines, as self reported homosexuals tend to appear in increasingly more gender-typical
occupations.
While the empirical findings support our model, it is nonetheless useful to con-
sider whether they are consistent with alternative models. We lend credibility to our
results by exploiting a very localized cross-sectional variation, i.e. variation across
1 Income and wage data are collected within the IHS, however the Office of National Statistics
(ONS) has so far not been able to harmonise the income variables across the different surveys that
comprise the IHS. Therefore, at the time of writing (January 2018) no income variables are included
in the datasets released by the ONS.
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local authorities within groups of on average four contiguous local authorities. We
show that results are not driven by the local labour market structure, nor they are
mechanically generated by the differential fraction of homosexuals across localities.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 briefly discusses
the relevant literature. Section 1.3 gives the motivating facts behind the theoretical
model and describes its set-up. It also discusses the equilibrium of the model, its
empirical implications and its limitations. Section 1.4 describes the data and the
empirical strategy. Section 1.5 brings the model to the data and empirically tests the
model’s implications. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Endogenous Disclosure of Sexual Orientation
Most of the literature on labour market outcomes and sexual identity has treated
self-reported sexual identity as an exogenous characteristic (Carpenter (2005), Car-
penter (2008a), Carpenter (2008b), Plug and Berkhout (2004), Aksoy et al. (2018)).
Few papers attempt to deal with the potential endogeneity of truly reporting own
sexual identity. Mueller-Smith (2014) uses a proxy from developmental psychology
literature to identify men who are more likely to be homosexuals - men with more
older brothers are more likely to identify as homosexuals. Adopting fraternal order as
a proxy for homosexual identity, he finds that men who are more likely to develop a
homosexual identity and are born in less tolerant locations are significantly less likely
to exert extra effort to signal heterosexuality to mask their latent identity, at the ex-
pense of lower mental health. Two other papers investigate whether wage penalty
and occupational choices of homosexuals differ between homosexuals who reveal their
identity to their employers and the ones who do not. Plug and Berkhout (2008) use
information on both self-reported sexual identity and workplace disclosure, finding
that the wage penalty for homosexuals workers is driven by homosexual workers who
do not disclose their identity to their employer. Discussing the endogeneity of dis-
closure, they observe that among homosexual workers, disclosed workers are abler
workers. Using data on twins, Plug et al. (2014), examine whether homosexuals sort
into tolerant occupations. They provide an array of interesting results. First, their
results indicate that homosexual workers sort into less prejudiced occupations. Sec-
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ond, they find that occupational segregation is largely driven by homosexual workers
who disclose their identities at the workplace. Third, homosexuals’ occupational
choices are not driven by productivity/tastes that they share with their identical
twin. Lastly, they also show that the sorting of prejudiced workers into occupations
characterised by a lower share of homosexuals is largely explained by characteristics
that they share with the identical twin (innate taste, ability or family background).
This implies that prejudiced heterosexual workers shy away from homosexual workers
for reasons other than their personal prejudice against homosexuals.
All these works acknowledge the importance of endogenising self-reported sex-
ual identity. This paper takes a step further and embeds this notion into a model of
occupational choice in the presence of discrimination. This allows us to derive im-
plications for the distribution of self-reported homosexuals and heterosexuals across




As anticipated, the model is justified by some stylised facts. First, 1.1 provides sug-
gestive evidence that dynamics of occupational segregation has potentially interesting
patterns. It clearly indicates that homosexuals tend to concentrate in gender atypical
jobs, meaning jobs where the share of people of the opposite gender is high. This
pattern has been already noted in the empirical literature (see for example Black
et al. (2007) and Antecol et al. (2008) for the U.S.). One obvious explanation for this
regularity is that homosexuals have tastes or comparative advantages that are closer
to those of the opposite gender. An alternative explanation is that it is more costly to
self-identify as homosexual in a gender typical occupation because of a higher penalty
imposed by heterosexual colleagues, employers or customers (in the form of harass-
ment or wage loss). Several theories are consistent with this hypothesis. In line with
the identity models developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), heterosexuals might
feel discomfort from working alongside homosexuals of the same gender, as this may
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influence the image they have of themselves or the image that others have of them.
For example, if others erroneously assume that individuals who work alongside ho-
mosexuals are themselves homosexuals, this might betray an individual’s inner sense
of self and induce an identity loss. One competing theory, along the lines of a pollu-
tion model (Goldin (2014a)), is that working alongside homosexuals affects the image
(the prestige) that others have of the job. Lastly, one could argue that customers,
co-workers or employers have beliefs about possible homosexual’s comparative ad-
vantage in gender-atypical jobs. To the extent that hiding one’s own sexual identity
is psychologically costly, whether differences in homosexual’s occupational choices
are driven by preferences or by the costs of coming out matters for welfare. This
has clear policy implications. On one hand, if occupational segregation is explained
by large costs associated with coming out, then policies aimed at reducing prejudice
in those occupations could be effective in decreasing labour market segregation. On
the other hand, if segregation is explained by innate tastes or preferences for certain
occupations, such policies would be ineffective.
Second, a positive gradient exists in the probability of reporting a homosexual
identity as a function of socio-economic status (SES). Table 1.2 shows that demo-
graphics usually correlated with higher SES, such as ethnicity, age, education and
country of birth positively affect the probability of reporting a homosexual identity
(with some differences between men and women). These correlations are very robust
to the inclusion of different geography fixed effects and neighbourhood characteris-
tics (moving from column (1) to (3) and from (4) to (6), stricter geographic controls
apply). As it seems reasonable to assume that the incidence of homosexuality is un-
correlated with major determinants of SES, this suggests that sexual identity is only
selectively disclosed. If, for example, the costs of (or the returns to) self-identifying
as homosexual fall (or respectively increase) at higher SES, then this would provides
a clear rationale for the observed gradient in the incidence of self-identified homo-
sexuals in the population. This suggests that part of the observed distribution of
homosexuals across jobs can be driven by selective disclosure.
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1.3.2 A Model of Occupational and Identity Choice
This section introduces a simple labour supply model where individuals choose both
an occupation and their revealed sexual identity. It borrows from Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2000)’s models of identity and it combines it with a Roy model of occupational
choice. This section discusses the model for homosexual men, although a symmetri-
cal model applies to homosexual women. The full theoretical model is described in
detail in Appendix A.
Homosexuals are a minority in society and, due to widespread homophobia, self-
identified homosexuals suffer a penalty. This can be thought of as a wage penalty
(a wage discrimination coefficient) or simply as the utility loss that results from
perceived discrimination. This may arise from aversion to homosexuals in the labour
market or in society as a whole, meaning that the heterosexual majority may have
a distaste against homosexuals and as a result they impose a cost to those who
self-identify as homosexuals.
In line with a body of literature from psychology (Herek and McLemore (2013)),
the model assumes that aversion to homosexuals is stronger within own gender
groups. Empirical evidence supports this claim. Patacchini et al. (2014) find that
male employers discriminate more against male homosexual candidates than female
homosexual candidates. This is because openly homosexual men threaten heterosex-
ual men’s masculine image of themselves, the masculinity of the job, or because of
the uneasiness that heterosexual men experience when surrounded by men who could
be sexually attracted to them2. If part of the cost of self-identifying as homosexual
is imposed by co-workers or customers, then the penalty that homosexuals pay for
coming out is lower in gender atypical occupations.
Latent homosexual workers have the option of self-identifying as heterosexuals
and avoid the penalty that is imposed on them by choosing to be part of the minority.
However, violating one’s sense of self leads to a utility loss. Latent homosexuals hence
simultaneously choose their occupation and revealed sexual identity based on the
penalty associated with each occupation and the utility loss resulting from denying
2Discrimination might also come from consumers who might feel that homosexual men are not
as good at performing male jobs (building) as heterosexual men and that perhaps homosexual men
are better than heterosexual men at performing female jobs (nursing or tailoring).
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one’s own latent sexual identity.
1.3.3 Set-up
The model focuses on a local labour market. To keep things simple, it assumes that
i) the demand for each occupation is fixed, ii) workers are geographically immobile,
iii) local wages are given, iv) workers are wage-takers and v) everybody is in work.
Subsection 1.3.6 discusses these assumptions in detail.
Let wja denote (self-identified) heterosexual workers’ wages in occupation j and
area and a Dja the penalty that self-identified homosexuals suffer in occupation j
and area a. Then:
lnwjG̃a = lnwja − lnDja
Variables with the tilde subscripts denote self-identified sexual identity: S (straight)
for heterosexual and G (gay) for homosexual - while variables without the tilde
subscript refer to latent identity. The following restricts to the case where self-
identification as homosexual leads to a wage penalty (Dja ≥ 1). This guarantees
that no latent heterosexual chooses to self-identify as a homosexual. In order to
derive choices, the model assumes the following pay-offs:
Ui(j, G̃|G, a) = βlnwja − βlnDja + lncj + εijG
Ui(j, S̃|G, a) = βlnwja + lncj − lnr + εijG
Ui(j, S̃|S, a) = βlnwja + εijS
where r > 1 is the identity loss that results from betraying one’s identity, cj denotes
(latent) homosexuals’ comparative advantage or preference for occupation j which is
assumed to be area invariant. The error terms εijS and εijG follow type-I extreme
value distributions and are independently distributed.
The model assumes that the penalty in occupation j and area a is a function
of two parameters: the fraction of opposite gender individuals in occupation j (0 ≤
fj ≤ 1) and the level of local tolerance (θa) which is assumed to be the same across
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occupations. For simplicity, we adopt the following functional form:
βlnDja = −lnθa − δlnfj
The model also assumes that preferences increase with the fraction of opposite
sex individuals in a certain occupation, namely:
lncj = γ + γ1lnfj
Assume that the occupations are sorted inversely according to the nationwide share of
opposite sex workers, i.e. fj > fj+1, which implies that Dja ≤ Dj+1a. Assume finally
that βlnDNa ≤ lnr < βlnDNa+1, or, which is the same, fNa ≥ [ 1rθa ]
1
δ > fNa+1. This
implies that in area a all latent homosexuals working in occupations j : fj ≥ fNa self
identify as homosexuals, while all those in occupations j : fj < fNa self identify as
heterosexuals.
1.3.4 Equilibrium
Assuming that the fraction of latent homosexuals across areas is the same, i.e.
Pr(G|a) = Pr(G) ≡ P , we derive the distribution of both latent and self-identified
homosexuals and heterosexuals in society across jobs (Pr(j|G, a), Pr(j|S, a), Pr(j|G̃, a),
Pr(j|S̃, a)) and overall Pr(G̃|a) and Pr(S̃|a)3. In particular, letting f δj θar = xja, in
equilbirium:
(i) Pr(G̃|a) is the sum across occupations of the share of latent individuals who









(ii) Given that no latent heterosexual self-identifies as homosexual in equilib-
rium, Pr(j|G̃, a) is the proportion of latent gays who choose occupation j and are
latent homosexuals. In each area, self-identified homosexuals distribute only in occu-
3See Appendix A for a full derivation of these results.
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(iii) Pr(j|S̃, a) is the proportion of self-identified heterosexuals who are truly




























The empirical analysis studies how the previous quantities respond to changes in
local tolerance θa. Assume that θa <
1
rfδNa
. Consider an infinitesimal increase in
tolerance dθa, such that limdθa→0+θa + dθa =
1
rfδNa+1
. In other terms, the increase in
tolerance implies that in area a all latent homosexuals in occupation j: fj = fNa+1
self-identify as homosexuals; in contrast, before the increase in tolerance, they all
identified as heterosexuals. Let us denote all occupations j : fj ≥ fNa as ”infra-
marginal” occupations and let denote occupation j : fj = fNa+1 as the ”marginal”
occupation.
Result 1: The fraction of self identified homosexuals in society increases: ∂Pr(G̃|a)∂θa ≥
0
This result is quite intuitive. As tolerance increases, it is relatively less costly to
identify as homosexual within for each occupation. Therefore, in each infra-marginal
occupation, a higher share of latent homosexuals self-identifies as such. Furthermore,
in the marginal occupation, all latent homosexuals report their true identity rather
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than conceal it.
Result 2: The fraction of self identified homosexuals in infra-marginal occupations
falls, while the fraction in the marginal occupation rises:
∂Pr(k|G̃,a,k≤Na)
∂θa
≤ 0 and ∂Pr(j|G̃,a,j=Na+1)∂θa ≥ 0
As tolerance increases, there are effects on both disclosure and occupational choices.
Closeted homosexuals in the marginal occupation disclose their true identity. This is
accompanied by a shift of self-identified homosexuals towards gender atypical occupa-
tions, as it now pays to self-identify as homosexual and suffer a wage penalty rather
than suffer an identity loss. Overall, the increase in the fraction of self identified
homosexual is greater in the marginal occupation compared to infra-marginal ones,
meaning that the fraction of self identified homosexuals in infra-marginal (marginal)
occupations falls (rises).
Result 3: The opposite happens for self-identfied heterosexuals: the fraction of self-
identified heterosexual in infra-marginal occupations increases: ∂Pr(k|S̃,a,k≤Na)∂θa ≥ 0
In this model, latent heterosexuals are not affected by the change in tolerance. How-
ever, consistently with result 2, the decrease in the fraction of self-identified het-
erosexuals is greater in the marginal occupations compared to infra-marginal ones.
This implies that the fraction of individuals who self-identify as heterosexuals in
infra-marginal occupation rises.
Result 4: Occupational segregation across groups with different self-reported sexual









In equilibrium, greater local tolerance implies that self identified homosexuals are
more dispersed across occupations relative to self identified heterosexuals.
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1.3.6 Limitations of the Model
This simple model rests on a number of simplifying assumptions, among which ex-
ogeneity of wages, absence of migration, specific functions for preferences towards a
job and identity costs. This subsection briefly discusses these limitations.
First, in the setup of the model wages received by self-identified heterosexuals
are allowed to vary both across jobs and across localities. However, given that in-
dividuals can freely move across jobs, one would expect that wages equalize across
jobs. Instead, in our framework, wages do not respond to the number of people who
self-select into an occupation. An extension of the model could endogenise wages
received by latent heterosexuals by assuming a local labour demand for each job and
that latent heterosexuals have preferences or a comparative advantage for some jobs.
Second, workers are assumed to be immobile. Without any doubt, this is the
strongest assumption behind our model. Unfortunately our data does not allow
us to test this assumption, nor to give an estimate of migration of self-identified
homosexuals workers between local authorities. A more complex version of this
simple model could add an additional decisional layer, allowing workers not only
to choose a job and a sexual identity, but also to choose the local authority where to
reside and work. In particular, homosexuals may compensate the costs of migration
by moving to a locality that is friendlier towards homosexuality and escaping the
penalty imposed on them.
Third, in the model everybody is in employment. One way to introduce unem-
ployment would be to define pay-offs for the choice of not entering the labour market,
characterised by a log wage of zero, no comparative advantage/taste, a cost of society-
wide discrimination (lnθa) if self-identifying as homosexual, and a psychological cost
of concealing own identity otherwise (lnr). In this scenario, in equilibrium every-
body chooses to join the labour market and the distribution of latent and reported
homosexuals across jobs follows the one found in our model.
Fourth, the cost of concealing one’s own sexual identity does not vary across
individuals. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the error term in the
pay-offs varies with latent sexual identity (and not with reported identity). One
direct advantage of this assumption is higher tractability. In particular, this simplifi-
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cation implies that P (G̃|G, j, a) is either equal to one or zero, meaning that all latent
homosexuals in a job either come out or conceal their identity, without individual
heterogeneity.
Fifth, there are no externalities in this model. An extension of the model may
include a term that allows the payoff of reporting a homosexual identity in a job to
increase with the fraction of individuals who report being homosexuals in that same
job. Such a term could account for the psychological benefits in being surrounded by
other openly homosexual workers or in increased chances of meeting a partner.
Last, rather than explaining, our model assumes that homosexuals prefer (or
society prefers that homosexuals perform) gender atypical occupations. To motivate
such assumption, the model draws on empirical evidence on the relationship between
the fraction of women and the fraction of reported homosexuals in an occupation
(examples also to be found in Blandford (2003), Black et al. (2007) and Antecol et al.
(2008)). It also draws on a rich body of literature on occupation and gender that
highlights the dependence of men’s preferences on the gender composition of their
occupation (Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Goldin (2014b), Pan (2015)). Following
the psychology and sociology literature, we argue that similar preferences also apply
to the (own gender) sexual composition of one’s occupation, because of the strong
connection between sexual prejudice and gender role norms. For example, masculinity
is often conceptualised as a status that must be achieved, one that can be easily lost
unless men repeatedly prove themselves to others. Males who do not conform to
gender role expectations thus risk a variety of negative consequences, from being
labelled as homosexuals to being punished with homophobic aggressions (Herek and
McLemore (2013)).
1.4 Data and Unit of Analysis
To explore how occupational segregation across groups with different self-reported
sexual identity responds to changes in tolerance, the paper uses a confidential version
of the UK Integrated Household Survey (IHS). The IHS is an annual composite survey
collected by the UK Office for National Statistics that combines a core of variables
collected from several of household surveys. The data refer to years 2010-2014 and
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include information on about 750,000 individuals aged 16-69. The confidential version
of the data includes information about respondents’ self-reported sexual orientation,
the local authority of residence and detailed occupation and industry codes.
Respondents in the survey are asked about their sexual identity; that is, how
they would describe themselves at the time the interview took place. The sexual
identity question is administered to all members of the household aged at least 16
who were available at the time of the interview to provide their own responses - no
proxy responses are allowed - and for this reason personal non-proxy weights are
provided (and applied). Depending on the original survey, the question is adminis-
tered face-to-face or using Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CATI). Either
way, the question is asked in a way that ensures confidentiality and consequentially
minimises the risk of misreported respondents’ sexual identity (Joloza et al. (2011)).
Table 1.1 provides the distribution of self-reported sexual identity by gender. The
overwhelming majority of respondents reports a heterosexual identity (respectively
93% of men and 94% of women). Only 1.7% of male respondents and 0.9% of fe-
male respondents self-identify as homosexuals. A more even proportion of male and
female respondents self-identify as bisexual or with other identities (0.7 and 1% re-
spectively). These numbers are similar to other smaller population-based survey in
the UK (Joloza et al. (2011)). In the analysis, we adopt a strict definition of homo-
sexual identity (respondents reporting a homosexual identity). We also show that
results are not affected if a broader definition is adopted.
Given that we do not observe whether individuals disclose their identity at their
workplace, we assume that i) individuals who disclose their homosexual identity to
the interviewer also do so to their co-workers and employer, ii) individuals who do not
disclose their homosexual identity to the interviewer do not do so at their workplace.
On the one hand, this latter assumption seems realistic, as the economic and social
risk from disclosing sexual behaviour to a survey interviewer is less than the risk from
workplace disclosure. On the other hand, we acknowledge that coming out to the
interviewer is an imprecise proxy of coming out at the workplace and that a variable
measuring the extent of workplace disclosure would be more appropriate (Badgett
(1995), Plug and Berkhout (2008), Plug et al. (2014)).
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The survey records respondents’ local authority (LA) of residence, the lowest
level of administrative geography in the country. On average each LA includes about
2,000 respondents (with standard deviation 1,400). In the empirical analysis, local
authorities are our main unit of analysis. One of our main dependent variables is the
fraction of workers self-identifying as homosexuals in a local authority and we exploit
cross-sectional variations across local authorities within small groups of contiguous
local authorities to identify a (more plausibly) causal relationship. Given that the
IHS provides only information on where individuals reside, it is assumed that the
local authority of residence coincides with the local authority where the individual
works.
For the empirical part, in order to capture the nature of the job the respondent
undertakes, we combine information about individuals’ occupation (SOC2010 cod-
ing) and industry (SIC 2007 coding).4 In the main analysis, we construct the job
category from the combination of one-digit occupation category and one-digit indus-
try category, for a total of 81 job-categories. As a robustness check, we also show
that results are robust if we define a job-category as the interaction of two-digits and
three-digits classifications of occupation and industry.
This data is complemented with attitudes towards homosexuality derived from
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is a longitudinal survey,
where each adult member of a sampled household is interviewed annually. Every two
years from 1998-2008, respondents are asked to what extent they agreed with the
statement “Homosexual relationships are always wrong”. We construct an index of
tolerance at local level by pulling together answers from 2002 to 20085 and computing
the weighted share of the answers (“Strongly disagree”, “Disagree”, “Neither agree,
disagree”) at the local authority level. This index ranges from a minimum of 20% in
North West Leicestershire (least tolerant local authority) to a maximum of 100% in
4 The industry category mainly refers to the economic sector to which the work done in a partic-
ular job contributes. Occupations are instead defined according to the concept of “skill level” and
“specialisation” (experience needed and field of knowledge required to pursue the occupation compe-
tently). For example, a person’s job can be occupationally “managerial” and industrially pertaining
to “manufacturing”.
5Our identification strategy relies on instrumenting local tolerance with the share of non-religious
individuals. Given that the share of non-religious individuals is measured in 2001 Census, we con-
struct our measure of local tolerance using information after 2001 (so omitting years 1998 and 2000).
The results are very similar if the measure of local tolerance is computed using data from 1998 to
2008 (not reported).
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fifty-four local authorities (maximum tolerance).
Local area characteristics are mainly derived from the IHS itself or from census
data. These include deprivation and population density from 2011 Census and the
fraction of non-religious individuals from 2001 Census. Details of political controls of
local authorities are available on the Elections Centre (Plymouth University) website.
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Let G̃anr denote the log odd of reporting a homosexual identity in local authority a,
sub-region6 n, region r. We first analyse how the relative proportion of self-identified
homosexuals is correlated to local tolerance with the following basic econometric
specification:
G̃an = α+ β Tolerancean + γ Xanr + ψn + εan (1.1)
where Tolerancean is the log odd of residents in the LA reporting that homosexual
relationships aren’t wrong, Xan is a vector of local authority characteristics, and ψn
are sub-region fixed effects. Hence, to reduce measurement error in the tolerance
variable, and to attenuate reverse causality concerns, we instrument Tolerancean
with the share of non-religious individuals living in the local authority in 2001. As
covariates, first we include sub-region fixed effects, that allow us to controls for un-
observed heterogeneity between small groups of local authorities. One significant
element that this geographical control accounts for is, for example, climate, a proxy
for local amenities, that in Black et al. (2002) are found to be a major determinant
of homosexuals’ concentration. Second, in a further attempt to control for local
amenities, in the most demanding specification we also control for the share of de-
prived household and population density. This latter control captures the degree of
urbanisation of the local authority. Third, we control for population composition in
terms of education and age and for contextual political views in the local authority.
Separate equations for men and women take into account any differences in men’s
and women’s labour market decisions and experiences.
Then, to measure differences in the distribution of self-identified homosexuals
6sub-regions correspond to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics of Level 3
(NUTS3). There are 128 NUTS3 in Britain, and, average, a NUTS3 includes 4 LAs.
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and non homosexuals across jobs, we adopt the most widespread measure of segre-
gation, the dissimilarity index7 (Duncan and Duncan (1955)). We are interested in
measuring, for each local authority, segregation between workers with homosexual




Σj |Pr(j|G̃, a)− Pr(j|S̃, a)| (1.2)
where j denotes a job and a a local authority. The index relates the share of the
overall workforce with a homosexual identity that works in a particular occupation-
industry to the share of the overall non-homosexual (self-reported) workforce in the
same job. It ranges from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation) and it can be
interpreted as the percentage of self-reported homosexual workers that would have
to move to different jobs to produce an even distribution relative to non-homosexual
workers. An important property of the dissimilarity index is that it is scale invariant,
meaning that if a number of concealed homosexual workers suddenly identify as
homosexual, causing the number of self-identify homosexuals to double across a local
authority without affecting the share in each job, then the value of the index does
not change8.
Last, we study the relationship between local tolerance and segregation with
the following econometric model:
DIan = η + δ ˜Tolerancean + λ Xan + ψn + ζan (1.3)
whereDIan is the segregation index in local authority a, sub-region n, ˜Tolerancean
7 See Massey and Denton (1988) for a discussion of the dissimilarity index and a comparison
with other measures. Recent examples of its application to study labour market segregation can be
found in Blau et al. (2013) (gender segregation across occupations), Bansak et al. (2012) (gender
segregation across firms), Glitz (2014) (ethnic segregation across occupations).
8The dissimilarity index enjoys four other properties: 1) symmetry in groups: jobs can be re-
ordered, yet the value of the index remains the same; 2) symmetry between types: the index is
symmetrical in the sense that the segregation of self-identified homosexual workers is the same as
the one of non-homosexual workers; 3) organisational equivalence: the index is unaffected by the
number of units over which it is computed. If a job splits into two jobs by proportional division,
then the value of the dissimilarity index does not change; 4) transfers (weak form): movements of
self-reported homosexual workers from jobs where they are over-represented (above the local labour
market-wide proportion) to jobs where they are under-represented (below the local labour market-
wide proportion) affect the value of the index. However, the index is insensitive to the redistribution
of self-reported homosexual workers among jobs with a proportion of self-reported homosexuals above
or below the labour market-wide proportion.
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is the instrumented log odd of residents in the LA reporting that homosexual rela-
tionships aren’t wrong, while Xan is the vector of local authority characteristics and
ψn are sub-region fixed effects.
1.5 Empirical Analysis
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.3 reports the dissimilarity index computed nation-wide for different groups
of workers. Occupational segregation along gender lines is very pronounced - about
45% of women (or men) should move job to have a similar distribution to the other
gender across jobs. Systematic segregation along sexual identity lines appears to be a
very relevant dimension too. About 30% of self-reported homosexual men and about
20% of self-reported homosexual women should change job in order to produce an
even distribution relative to their non-homosexual counterpart. Segregation along
ethnicity lines (white ethnicity versus ethnic minorities) and country of birth (UK
born versus migrants) are less pronounced.9
Figure 1.2 gives a graphical representation of the negative correlation between
segregation and the proportion of self-reported homosexuals in a local authority’s
labour market. We claim that increased tolerance is the force underlying this dy-
namic. As tolerance increases, more latent homosexuals self identify as homosexuals
in the labour market and occupational segregation of self-reported homosexuals falls,
as self-identified homosexuals increasingly enter gender typical occupations. The
econometric analysis presented in the next section explores this claim.
Table 1.4 reports some descriptive statistics to provide further evidence in sup-
port of this claim. Each line represents a quintile of the distribution of local author-
ities by the share of self identified homosexuals, separately by gender. For example,
on average in local authorities in the first quantile less than one individual out of
1,000 self identify as homosexual (0.04% for men, 0.01% for women), while in the
fifth quantile more than one individual in 100 reports a homosexual identity (5.14%
for men, 2.01% for women). In areas characterised by a higher proportion of self-
9 Table B.1 in the Appendix reports values of the dissimilarity index computed for more granular
definitions of job and if bisexuals are included in the homosexual group.
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identified homosexuals, homosexuals enter more gender atypical jobs, as predicted
by the model: column (1) reports the quintile-average minimum nation-wide share of
opposite gender workers in occupations taken up by self-identified homosexuals. In
local authorities in higher quantiles, homosexuals are present in jobs characterised
by a lower share of individuals of the opposite gender. Column (2) displays the level
of tolerance in the local authorities of the quantile, measured as the share of indi-
viduals who do not agree that homosexual relationships are wrong. In this simple
tabulation, no clear pattern emerges between tolerance and the proportion of self-
reported homosexuals. As mentioned in the empirical strategy section, to deal with
possible measurement error in our tolerance variable, local tolerance is instrumented
with the share of people who are not religious in the empirical analysis in section
1.4.1. The last column displays the average dissimilarity index of local authorities in
the quantile. As we move to higher quantiles, segregation along sexual identity lines
decreases both for men and women, as the model predicts.
1.5.2 Econometric Evidence
This section tests empirically the relationship between local tolerance, the fraction of
self-identified homosexuals in the labour market and occupational segregation. In or-
der to attenuate possible measurement error and reverse causality concerns, average
local tolerance in 2002-2008 is instrumented with the share of non-religious individu-
als at baseline (2001). The bottom panel in Table 1.5 provides first stage coefficients’
estimates and F-stats. For each specification, the share of non-religious residents is
highly positively correlated with local tolerance. According to the specification, the
F-stat ranges from 7.83 to 10.7710.
Panel A) Fraction of self-reported homosexuals provides estimates of β from
equation (1), exploiting the cross-sectional variation in tolerance at the local author-
ity level. Column (1) shows the estimated β in a baseline specification, controlling
for sub-region fixed effects. This implies that the variation exploited is a very local
one, as it relies on variation in local tolerance across on average four contiguous local
authorities. All regressions are weighted by population size. Consistently with the
10 F-test are close or lower then the threshold level of 10, raising potential concerns about weak
instrument, that tends to bias the results towards the OLS result.
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model implication, the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero and
indicates that a 1% increase in the odds of predicted tolerance leads to 0.91% increase
in the odds of reporting a homosexual identity for men. The point estimate drops
slightly when adding local authorities’ characteristics. Columns (3)-(4) repeat the
exercise for women. The estimated coefficient for instrumented tolerance is signifi-
cantly different from zero in the baseline specification, but not in the full specification
when local authorities’ characteristics are added. We can speculate that the nature
of prejudice against male and female homosexuals is different and that the BHPS
question (“Homosexual relationships are always wrong”) detects tolerance towards
homosexual men only11. The OLS estimates presented in Table B.2 are consistent
with these estimates, with higher point estimates but lower significance levels.
Panel B) Segregation presents estimates of equation (3) for men (columns (1)-
(2)) and women (columns (3)-(4)). The dependent variable in all regressions is seg-
regation, measured by the dissimilarity index. Results indicate a strong negative
relationship between local tolerance and segregation. Hence, a 1% increase in the log
odds of predicted tolerance leads to a decrease of 0.23 and 0.14 percentage points in
the dissimilarity index for men and women respectively. The results remain robust
to the addition of local authorities’ characteristics in columns (3) and (6).
However, there are two potential concerns with these estimates. First, the de-
gree of segregation depends on the local occupational structure; that is, the relative
size of segregated versus non-segregated jobs. This implies that differences in segre-
gation across localities may occur as a by-product of a different local occupational
mix. So, for example, if tolerant localities are also those historically characterised by
the importance of predominantly female occupations (services, for example), the esti-
mated coefficients in Panel B) would overestimate the true effect. To control for the
occupational structure, we re-compute the dissimilarity index following Blau et al.
(2013). For each local authority, we keep the local occupational composition fixed,
mimicking the occupational distribution we observe nationally. Panel C) Segregation
under fixed occupational composition reports the sensitivity of the results when the
11If we believe that our index of tolerance equally captures attitudes towards male and female
homosexuality, another possibility is that latent homosexual women are truly unresponsive to local
tolerance, in contrast with predictions from the model.
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dissimilarity index is computed assuming a fixed occupational structure, separately
for men and women. The results confirm the negative gradient between tolerance and
segregation. The point estimates are smaller than the ones in Panel B), indicating
that a sizeable part of the effect can be attributed to differences in local authorities’
occupational structure (40% for men and 16% for women).
Second, the dissimilarity index can also be positive when workers are randomly
allocated across jobs, especially when, as in this case, the share of the minority group
is small (Carrington and Troske (1997)). This leads to potentially larger values of
the index where the proportion of self-identified homosexuals in a local authority is
small, even if there is no underlying systematic segregation. In an effort to address
this problem, we take as reference local authority the locality with the lowest pro-
portion of self-identified homosexual workers by gender. We re-sample in each local
authority the number of self-identified homosexuals such that the proportion of self-
identified homosexual is the same. We compute the dissimilarity index repeating this
procedure 100 times separately by gender and we average the dissimilarity indices
obtained. Results from Panel D) Segregation under fixed minority share report es-
timated coefficients significantly smaller in magnitude than the previous regressions,
confirming the fact that part of the correlation was due to an element of randomness.
Nevertheless, coefficients are negative and significant, confirming the prediction of our
model: as local tolerance increases, self-identified homosexuals are less segregated in
gender atypical occupations.
Table 1.6 explores empirical evidence of self-reported homosexuals entering oc-
cupations that are less gender atypical (i.e. for homosexual men, less feminine) in
local authorities characterised by a higher tolerance towards homosexuals. Gender
atypicality of job is measured as the share of individuals of the opposite gender in
the occupation at the national level. The dependent variable in the regressions of
Table 1.6 is, for each local authority, the minimum value of gender atypicality among
the jobs of self-reported homosexuals. The intuition is that as tolerance increases,
self-reported homosexuals enter increasingly more gender typical jobs (Result 2).
Therefore we expect the minimum value of gender atypicality among the jobs taken
by self-reported homosexuals to decrease (as observed in the descriptive statistics).
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Panel A) provides limited evidence of this phenomenon: coefficients are overall neg-
ative, but not significant for men. When we repeat the exercise assuming a fixed
minority share, results for women are marginally less significant as before.
1.5.3 Robustness Checks
This section explores the sensitiveness of the main results to how we define a job,
which respondents we categorise as homosexual and how we define local tolerance.
Our results prove to be robust to these different choices, providing reassurance that
our findings do not depend on ad-hoc definitions of the variables of interest.
First, Table 1.7 considers whether the results on segregation are affected by how
we define a job. Instead of defining a job as the combination of one digit occupation
and one digit industry code, in Panel A) Job 2x2 a job is defined as the combination
of two digits occupation and two digits industry codes, for a total of about 500
job categories; in Panel B) Job 3x3 is defined as the combination of three digits
occupation and three digits industry codes, for a total of about 5,000 job categories.
With the exception of few specifications, all estimates are significant and of the same
negative sign. However, point estimates vary: moving to more granular definitions
of job, point estimates halve in magnitude at each step.
Second, in Table 1.8 we repeat the analysis by using a more generous definition
of homosexual identity. Specifically, we include in the definition of workers with
homosexual identity respondents who self-report an homosexual identity or a bisexual
identity. Results confirm previous findings: local tolerance increases the fraction of
male workers who report being homosexual or bisexuals (Panel A)). Furthermore,
these workers distribute more evenly across jobs ( Panels B), C), D)).
Third, we modify our definition of tolerance by only including individuals who
report that homosexual relationships are strictly not wrong in BHPS (2002-2008).
Tolerance is computed as the weighted share of the answers (“Strongly disagree”,
“Disagree”) between 2002 and 2008 at local authority level (so excluding “Neithr
agree, disagree” answers). Results in Table 1.9 are consistent with previous findings:
point estimates are larger, suggesting an even stronger effect of tolerance on the
fraction of individuals reporting an homosexual identity in the labour market and
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segregation. However, the instrument is weak as indicated by the F-statistics being
below the conventional value of 10.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper examines the dynamics of occupational segregation of self-identified ho-
mosexual workers, specifically accounting for the fact that part of their observed
distribution across jobs may come from selective disclosure. This is an important
but generally overlooked feature that differentiates the study of sexual minorities to
other perfectly observable minorities in the labour market, such as women or ethnic
minorities. To do so, we outline a simple labour supply model where individuals
choose both an occupation and their revealed sexual identity.
We motivate the model with two stylised facts. First, we show that self-reported
homosexuals tend to concentrate into gender atypical jobs. Second, we show that the
incidence of (reported) homosexual identity is higher for individual characteristics
associated with a lower cost of being homosexual. These two facts suggest that dif-
ferences in occupational choices along the lines of sexual identity may be driven by
tastes or occupational-specific costs of revealing one’s own identity. Using confiden-
tial data from the UK, we demonstrate that, consistently with the predictions of the
model, a greater fraction of homosexuals reports their latent homosexual identity as
tolerance increases. More importantly, we show that as tolerance increases, occupa-
tional segregation of self-reported homosexuals falls, as self-identified homosexuals
are increasingly less segregated into gender atypical occupations. The findings sug-
gest that part of the observed segregation of homosexuals in opposite sex occupations
is due to selective disclosure rather tastes or comparative advantage.
While the theoretical and empirical evidence proposed here sheds some lights on
the likelihood of reporting a homosexual identity, occupational segregation and their
relationship with attitudes towards homosexuality, a few caveats should be kept in
mind. In our discussion, we do out best to control for potential omitted variables,
but we cannot completely rule out the endogeneity of local tolerance. Furthermore,
plausible migration of homosexual workers towards more tolerant areas is a crucial
factor that we do not account for. Nevertheless, this work constitutes a concrete step
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in getting a better sense of how prejudice affects occupational segregation of homo-
sexual workers. One natural direction for future research is to disentangle whether
occupational choices are ultimately driven by tastes or discrimination, a challenge
shared with the literature on gender.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: Fraction of self-reported homosexuals and individuals of the opposite
gender in the same job
Service occ. in transport
Machine operative in banking
Service occ. in services
Elementary occ. in construction
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Professional in public admin, edu, health
Service occ. in costruction
Skilled trades in costruction
Sales in services
Administrative occ. in services
Services in public admin, edu, health

























Fraction of oppostite gender
Note: Incidence of self-reported homosexual workers across jobs as a function of fraction of opposite
gender workers (log odd ratios) by gender. The left panel relates to men, the right panel to women.
Each circle represents a job, where a job is defined as the combination of one-digit occupation
(SOC2010) and one-digit industry (ISCO07), for a total of 81 job-categories. The size of the dot
reflects the size of the job-category among the opposite gender. For each gender, the two jobs
who employ most workers with the highest and the lowest fraction of self-reported homosexuals are
labelled.
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Note: Relationship between the relative incidence of self-reported homosexuals in a local authority
and occupational segregation along sexual identity, measured by the dissimilarity index. The left
panel relates to men, the right panel to women. Each circle represents a local authority. The size of
the dot reflects the size of the population in the local authority.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Sexual identity by gender
Gender
Self Reported Sexual Identity Men Women Total
Heterosexual 92.74 93.70 93.22
Homosexual 1.63 0.83 1.23
Bisexual 0.38 0.65 0.52
Other 0.33 0.28 0.30
Don’t Know/Refuse 3.63 3.46 3.55
Missing 1.28 1.08 1.18
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Self-reported sexual identity by gender. Sexual identity non-proxy weights applied. In face-
to-face questionnaire, the exact question asked “Which of the options [on this card] best describes how
you think of yourself?” (similar question in CATI mode of interview). “Don’t Know/Refusal” were
not explicitly provided as options, however, interviewers were able to record them if spontaneously
provided by respondents, consistent with standard ONS survey practice. A missing value refers to
where an eligible responder did not provide any response to the question, for example the interviewers
were unable to ask the question (Joloza et al. (2011)).
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Table 1.2: Probability of reporting homosexual identity
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
White ethnicity 1.287∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.139) (0.137) (0.170) (0.170) (0.137)
Age 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Age squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age finished edu 0.129∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012)
Age finished edu sq. -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UK-born 0.224∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.120) (0.120) (0.092)
Fixed Effects Region Sub-region LA Region Sub-region LA
LA charact yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 329,233 329,233 318,391 421,883 421,883 318,391
Pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.064 0.088 0.026 0.028 0.088
Notes: Conditinal logit regressions. In each column, the dependent variable is a dummy for reporting
a homosexual identity. LA characteristics: Share of white ethnicity individuals residing in the local
authority, mean age and mean age square, age finished education and age finished education square,
and share of individuals born outside UK. Other controls included: survey year dummies, mode of
interview dummy. Standard errors clustered at the LA level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 1.3: Segregation across different groups
Dissimilarity Index
Gender 0.44
Sexual Identity (Men) 0.32
Sexual Identity (Women) 0.21
Ethnicity 0.15
Country of birth 0.15
Notes: The table ranks the nation-wide Dissimilarity Index calculated along different dimensions.
The Dissimilarity index ranges from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation). It can be
interpreted as the share of individuals of one group that has to change job to achieve an even
distribution across job when compared to the other group.
Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Quintile Rank by P (G̃|a) Gender atypicality job Tolerance Dissimilarity Index
1 0.50 0.81 0.97
2 0.33 0.81 0.91
Men 3 0.24 0.81 0.84
4 0.19 0.81 0.77
5 0.17 0.84 0.67
1 0.23 0.84 0.92
2 0.35 0.82 0.87
Women 3 0.29 0.80 0.87
4 0.24 0.80 0.72
5 0.21 0.83 0.64
Notes: The table reports separately for men and women, for each quintile of the distribution of local
authorities by the share of self-identified homosexuals, a measure of how much gender-atypical jobs
taken by self-identified homosexuals are, tolerance and the dissimilarity index. The measure Gender
atypicality job corresponds to the quantile-average minimum share of opposite gender workers in
an occupation (measured nation-wide) taken by self-identified homosexuals residing in the local
authorities of the quantiles. Tolerance is the log odds ratio of the proportion of population in the
LA of residence reporting that homosexual relationships are not wrong, from the British Household
Panel Survey (2002-2008). The Dissimilarity Index is computed as described in section 1.5.
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Table 1.5: Fraction of self-identified homosexuals, segregation and tolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
A) Fraction of self-reported homosexuals
Tolerance 0.913*** 0.838** 0.549* 0.326
(0.347) (0.374) (0.317) (0.300)
B) Segregation
Tolerance -0.226*** -0.238*** -0.135** -0.114**
(0.072) (0.086) (0.055) (0.054)
C) Segregation under fixed occ composition
Tolerance -0.137*** -0.137** -0.113** -0.095*
(0.047) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
D) Segregation under fixed minority share
Tolerance -0.029*** -0.030** -0.060** -0.046**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022)
F-stage
% Non religious 2001 8.600*** 8.172*** 8.423*** 8.656***
(2.620) (2.920) (2.627) (2.880)
F-stat 10.77 7.83 10.28 9.04
Obs 255 255 254 254
FE sub-region sub-region sub-region sub-region
LA controls yes yes
Notes: each panel corresponds to a set of regressions with the following dependent variables: Panel
A) fraction of individuals in work reporting a homosexual identity for each local authority (log
odds); Panel B) occupational segregation measures with the dissimilarity index; Panel C) occupa-
tional segregation measured with the dissimilarity index computed under fixed occupational com-
position (mimicking the national distribution); Panel D) occupational segregation measured with
the dissimilarity index computed assuming a fixed proportion of self-identified homosexual workers
in each local authority. The main independent variable, Tolerance is the fraction of individuals in
the LA reporting that homosexual relationships are not wrong, from the British Household Panel
Survey (2002-2008) (log odds). Tolerance is instrumented with the fraction of individuals who are
not religious in the local authority, from 2001 Census. Additional local authorities controls included
are mean age in the local authority, mean age when left education, share of deprived households
(2011), population density (2011), years of conservative party control (2000-2015). Standard errors
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 1.6: Gender atypicality of self-reported homosexuals’ marginal job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
A) Gender atypicality of marginal job
Tolerance -0.042 -0.034 -0.149** -0.126*
(0.061) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
B) Under fixed minority share
Tolerance 0.074 0.076 -0.100* -0.093
(0.050) (0.059) (0.060) (0.063)
Obs 255 255 254 254
FE sub-region sub-region sub-region sub-region
LA controls yes yes
Notes: each panel corresponds to a set of regressions in which the dependent variable is, for each local
authority, the minimum share of opposite gender workers in an occupation (measured nation-wide)
taken by self-identified homosexuals. In Panel B) this measure is computed assuming a fixed propor-
tion of self-identified homosexual workers in each local authority. The main independent variable,
Tolerance is the fraction of individuals in the LA reporting that homosexual relationships are not
wrong, from the British Household Panel Survey (2002-2008) (log odds). Tolerance is instrumented
with the fraction of individuals who are not religious in the local authority, from 2001 Census.
Additional local authorities controls included are mean age in the local authority, mean age when
left education, share of deprived households (2011), population density (2011), years of conservative
party control (2000-2015). Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Robustness: different definition of job




Tolerance -0.126*** -0.120*** -0.088*** -0.070**
(0.041) (0.045) (0.033) (0.031)
A2) Segregation under fixed occ composition
Tolerance -0.081*** -0.067** -0.082** -0.069**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034)
A3) Segregation under fixed minority share
Tolerance -0.009** -0.008 -0.020** -0.018*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
B) Job 3x3
B1) Segregation
Tolerance -0.070** -0.066** -0.043** -0.032
(0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
B2) Segregation under fixed occ composition
Tolerance -0.076*** -0.067** -0.060** -0.044
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
B3) Segregation under fixed minority share
Tolerance -0.007* -0.005 -0.018** -0.016*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Obs 255 255 254 254
FE sub-region sub-region sub-region sub-region
LA controls yes yes
Notes: in Panel A) Job 2x2 , we define a job as the combination of two digits occupation and two
digits industry codes (overall, about 500 categories); in Panel B) Job 3x3, we define it as the com-
bination of three digits occupation and three digits industry codes (overall, about 5000 categories).
In sub-panels A1) and B1) the dependent variable is occupational segregation measured with the
dissimilarity index; in sub-panels A2) and B2), the dependent variable is occupational segregation
measured with the dissimilarity index computed under fixed occupational composition (mimicking
the national distribution); in sub-panels A3) and B3), the dependent variable is occupational segre-
gation measured with the dissimilarity index computed assuming a fixed proportion of self-identified
homosexual workers in each local authority. The main independent variable Tolerance is the frac-
tion of individuals in the LA reporting that homosexual relationships are not wrong, from the BHPS
(2000-2008) (log odds). Tolerance is instrumented with the fraction of individuals who are not
religious in the local authority, from 2001 Census. Additional local authorities controls included
are mean age in the local authority, mean age when left education, share of deprived households
(2011), population density (2011), years of conservative party control (2000-2015). Standard errors
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 1.8: Robustness: different definition of homosexual identity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
A) Fraction of self-reported homosexuals and bisexuals
Tolerance 0.802** 0.675* 0.321 -0.019
(0.343) (0.347) (0.274) (0.252)
B) Segregation (job=1x1)
Tolerance -0.208*** -0.203*** -0.089* -0.055
(0.070) (0.075) (0.046) (0.043)
C) Segregation under fixed occ composition (job=1x1)
Tolerance -0.126*** -0.114** -0.051 -0.011
(0.048) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042)
D) Segregation under fixed minority share (job=1x1)
Tolerance -0.024** -0.025** -0.025* -0.021
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
F-stage
% Non-religious 2001 8.013*** 7.902** 8.429*** 8.811***
(2.574) (2.83) (2.451) (2.711)
F-stat 9.68 7.76 11.82 10.56
Obs 267 267 283 283
FE sub-region sub-region sub-region sub-region
LA controls yes yes
Notes: In these regressions, we define as self-reported homosexuals individuals who report a ho-
mosexual or a bisexual identity. Each panel correspond to a set of regressions with the following
dependent variables: Panel A) fraction of individuals in work reporting a homosexual or bisexual
identity for each local authority (log odds); Panel B) occupational segregation measures with the dis-
similarity index; Panel C occupational segregation measured with the dissimilarity index computed
under fixed occupational composition (mimicking the national distribution); Panel D) occupational
segregation measured with the dissimilarity index computed assuming a fixed proportion of self-
identified homosexual workers in each local authority. The main independent variable, Tolerance is
the fraction of individuals in the LA reporting that homosexual relationships are not wrong, from
the British Household Panel Survey (2000-2008) (log odds). Tolerance is instrumented with the
fraction of individuals who are not religious in the local authority, from 2001 Census. Additional
local authorities controls included are mean age in the local authority, mean age when left education,
share of deprived households (2011), population density (2011), years of conservative party control
(2000-2015). Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 1.9: Stricter definition of tolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
A) Fraction of self-reported homosexuals
Tolerance 1.344** 1.560* 0.918 0.629
(0.543) (0.846) (0.558) (0.642)
B) Segregation
Tolerance -0.289*** -0.371** -0.241** -0.259
(0.107) (0.187) (0.116) (0.165)
C) Segregation under fixed occ composition
Tolerance -0.165** -0.203* -0.197* -0.208
(0.065) (0.108) (0.100) (0.140)
D) Segregation under fixed minority share
Tolerance -0.041** -0.049* -0.122** -0.123
(0.017) (0.027) (0.055) (0.076)
F-stage
% Non religious 2001 6.204*** 5.050** 5.319** 4.293*
(2.222) (2.519) (2.352) (2.583)
F-stat 7.80 4.02 5.11 2.76
Obs 283 283 277 277
FE sub-region sub-region sub-region sub-region
LA controls yes yes
Notes: each panel correspond to a set of regressions with the following dependent variables: Panel A)
fraction of individuals in work reporting a homosexual identity for each local authority (log odds);
Panel B) occupational segregation measures with the dissimilarity index; Panel C) occupational
segregation measured with the dissimilarity index computed under fixed occupational composition
(mimicking the national distribution); Panel D) occupational segregation measured with the dis-
similarity index computed assuming a fixed proportion of self-identified homosexual workers in each
local authority. The main independent variable, Tolerance is the fraction of individuals in the LA
reporting that homosexual relationships are strictly not wrong, from the British Household Panel
Survey (2000-2008) (log odds). Tolerance is instrumented with the fraction of individuals who are
not religious in the local authority, from 2001 Census. Additional local authorities controls included
are mean age in the local authority, mean age when left education, share of deprived households
(2011), population density (2011), years of conservative party control (2000-2015). Standard errors




In this section we report the full equilibrium results. It is important to notice that
by endogenizing disclosure of own sexual identity, we can derive the distribution of
both latent (letters denoted without tilde) and self identified (letters denoted with G
tilde) homosexuals (G) and heterosexuals (S) across jobs.
Let f δj θar = xja, where xNa ≥ 1
(1) Pr(j|G, a) =

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Next, we provide proofs of the results illustrated in section 1.3. Let recall that we
are interested in how Pr(G̃|a), Pr(j, |G̃, a), Pr(j, |S̃, a, j ≤ Na) and ultimately DIa
respond to changes in local tolerance θa.
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Assume that θa <
1
rfδNa
. Consider an infinitesimal increase in tolerance dθa, such
that limdθa→0+θa + dθa =
1
rfδNa+1
. In other terms, the increase in tolerance implies
that in area a all latent homosexuals in occupation j: fj = fNa+1 self-identify as
homosexuals, while before the increase in tolerance, they all identified as heterosex-
uals. Let us denote all occupation j:fj ≥ fNa as ”infra-marginal” occupations and
let denote occupation j : fj = fNa+1 as the ”marginal” occupation. Furthermore,
let (θa + dθa)f
δ
kr = xka and θaf
δ
kr = xka.


































Result 2: The fraction of self identified homosexuals in infra-marginal occupations
falls, while the fraction in the marginal occupation rises.
Proof:





































Result 3: The opposite happens for self-identified heterosexuals: the fraction of























































Result 4: Occupational segregation across group with different self reported sexual
identity falls.
Proof:
The Duncan segregation index DI is DIa =
1
2Σk|Pr(k|G̃, a)− Pr(k|S̃, a)|
Let us start by noting that Pr(j|G̃, a) ≥ Pr(j|S̃, a) if and only if

















or, which is the same, if
fj ≥Max{fNa , fMa}















From the above, it follows that Pr(j|G̃, a) ≥ Pr(j|S̃, a) if and only if {fj ≥ fMa >
fNa} or {fj ≥ fNa > fMa}. Analysing the two cases separately:
Case 1: {fMa ≥ fNa}
DIa =
1
2Σfk≥fMa (Pr(k|G̃, a)−Pr(k|S̃, a))+
1
2Σfk<fMa (Pr(k|S̃, a)−Pr(k|G̃, a)) =
= Σfk≥fMa (Pr(k|G̃, a)− Pr(k|S̃, a))
Case 2: {fNa > fMa}
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DIa = Σfk≥fNa (Pr(k|G̃, a)− Pr(k|S̃, a))
So
DIa = Σfk≥max{fMa ,fNa}(Pr(k|G̃, a)− Pr(k|S̃, a))
In order to compute the comparative static on DIa, one has to consider also that
∂fNa
∂θa
≤ 0 and ∂fMa∂θa ≥ 0. Assume that, after an increase of dθa in θa, new sufficient
and necessary condition for Pr(j|G̃, θa+dθa) ≥ Pr(j|S̃, θa+dθa) is {fj ≥ fM ′a > fN ′a}
or {fj ≥ fN ′a > fM ′a}, where fN ′a ≤ fNa and fM ′a ≥ fMa . Three cases:
Case 1: fj ≥ max{fMa , fNa} → fj ≥ fNa and fj ≥ max{fM ′a , fN ′a} → fj ≥ fN ′a
∆DIa = Σfk≥fN′a
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa + dθa)]−
−Σfk≥fNa [Pr(k|G̃, θa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa)] =
= Σfk≥fNa [Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|G̃, θa)]+
+ΣfNa>fk≥fN′a
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa + dθa)] ≤ 0
because of Result 1 and by construction of fN ′a .
Case 2: fj ≥ max{fMa , fNa} → fj ≥ fNa and fj ≥ max{fM ′a , fN ′a} → fj ≥ fM ′a
∆DIa = Σfk≥fM′a
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa + dθa)]−
−Σfk≥fNa [Pr(k|G̃, θa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa)] =
= Σfk≥fNa [Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|G̃, θa)]+
+ΣfNa>fk≥fM′a
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa + dθa)] ≤ 0
because of Result 1 and by construction of fM ′a .
Case 3: fj ≥ max{fMa , fNa} → fj ≥ fMa and fj ≥ max{fM ′a , fN ′a} → fj ≥ fM ′a
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∆DIa = Σfk≥fM′a
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa + dθa)]−
−Σfk≥fMa [Pr(k|G̃, θa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa)] =
= Σfk≥fM′a
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|G̃, θa)]−
+ΣfM′a>fk≥fMa
[Pr(k|G̃, θa + dθa)− Pr(k|S̃, θa + dθa)]
that has ambiguous sign (first term negative, second term positive).
In equilibrium hence, greater local tolerance almost unequivocally implies that the
a greater fraction of the population self identifies as homosexuals and that self iden-




Table B.1: Segregation along sexual identity lines for granularity of job categories
and different homosexual definition
Dissimilarity Index Dissimilarity Index Dissimilarity Index
Job 1x1 Job 2x2 Job 3x3
Self reported homosexuals vs everybody else
Men 0.32 0.38 0.51
Women 0.21 0.28 0.42
Self reported homosexuals & bisexuals vs everybody else
Men 0.28 0.34 0.48
Women 0.16 0.22 0.34
Notes: The table reports the Dissimilarity Index along sexual identity lines calculated nation-wide
when a job is defined as the intersection between 1 digit occupation and 1 digit industry (Segregation
1x1, 81 categories), 2 digits occupation and 2 digits industry (Segregation 2x2, about 500 categories),
3 digits occupation and 3 digit industry (Segregation 3x3, about 5000 categories). In the top panel,
the two groups for which the Dissimilarity is computed are self-reported homosexuals versus self-
reported heterosexuals, bisexuals, other definition and don’t know answers. In the bottom panel,
the two groups for which the Dissimilarity is computed are self-reported homosexuals and bisexuals
versus self-reported heterosexuals, other definition and don’t know answers. The Dissimilarity index
ranges from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation). It can be interpreted as the share of
individuals of one group that has to change job in order to achieve an even distribution across job
when compared to the other group.
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Table B.2: OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
A) Fraction of self-reported homosexuals
Tolerance 0.110* 0.121* 0.001 -0.015
(0.064) (0.063) (0.070) (0.070)
B) Segregation
Tolerance -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.023** -0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
C) Segregation under fixed occ composition
Tolerance -0.015** -0.016** -0.016 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
D) Segregation under fixed minority share
Tolerance -0.002 -0.002 -0.009** -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs 255 255 254 254
FE sub-region sub-region sub-region sub-region
LA controls yes yes
Notes: each panel correspond to a set of regressions with the following dependent variables: Panel A)
fraction of individuals in work reporting a homosexual identity for each local authority (log odds);
Panel B) occupational segregation measures with the dissimilarity index; Panel C) occupational
segregation measured with the dissimilarity index computed under fixed occupational composition
(mimicking the national distribution); Panel D) occupational segregation measured with the dis-
similarity index computed assuming a fixed proportion of self-identified homosexual workers in each
local authority. The main independent variable, Tolerance is the fraction of individuals in the LA
reporting that homosexual relationships are not wrong, from the British Household Panel Survey
(2000-2008) (log odds). Additional local authorities controls included are mean age in the local
authority, mean age when left education, share of deprived households (2011), population density
(2011), years of conservative party control (2000-2015). Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01;
** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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An Incumbency Spillover Effect?
Running Against the “Pale,
Male and Stale” in British Local
Elections
2.1 Introduction
Women and ethnic minorities are still widely under-represented in governments and
national parliaments around the world.1 The academic literature supports the con-
ventional wisdom that women and ethnic minorities face biases - in the form of beliefs
that they lack the qualities for leadership or as pure taste based discrimination - when
attempting to enter the political arena (Fox and Lawless (2004), Bhavnani (2009),
Washington (2006), Thrasher et al. (2017)). If one problem that aspiring politicians
face is the belief that they are unelectable, what happens when women and ethnic
minorities have proven their electability by running for and winning office? Using
1 UK general election of 1987 saw the first ever black MPs. Fast forward 30 years and the 2017
result has seen 52 ethnic minority MPs elected (over 650 members). Similarly, the number of African-
American U.S. Congress members has steadily increased since the first African-Americans entered
Congress in 1870, peaking to 49 members in the current legislative session (over 535 members).
In both cases, the share of ethnic minority representatives is below their share of the population.
Several countries have been led by women in the last decade: UK, Germany, Argentina, Thailand
among others. However, in only a third of national parliaments around the world the share of women
exceeds 30% (Women in National Parliaments http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm)
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data from English local elections, this paper investigates whether the electoral suc-
cess of women and ethnic minorities leads to subsequent increases in these groups’
representation as political candidates.
The paper uses data covering the universe of the 7,707 electoral wards of England
spanning over 40 years (1973-2014) to investigate whether a woman or an ethnic
minority winning a seat in the local council leads, in subsequent elections, to increased
candidacy and electoral success for individuals from the same group in the same area.
A candidate’s electoral success can impact future candidacy and electoral per-
formance of people belonging to the same group by acting both on the demand for
candidates and the supply of candidates. On the demand side, an electoral success
has the potential to shape the attitudes of voters and parties towards women or eth-
nic minorities in politics, leading to greater demand for similar candidates. On the
supply side, winning candidates can create a positive role model effect, encouraging
individuals belonging to the same group to stand as candidates.
In order to estimate the causal effect of a woman or ethnic minority win-
ning a seat in the local council, this paper uses a regression discontinuity design
(RD).2 We compare political representation as candidates in electoral wards where
a woman/ethnic minority has previously narrowly won a seat in the local council to
political representation in wards where they have experienced a narrow defeat. To
lend credibility to the identification strategy, several tests on the validity to the RD
are presented.
Our analysis provides three main results. First, both women and ethnic mi-
norities enjoy a personal incumbency advantage, i.e. candidates are more likely to
re-run for elections and to be re-elected following a personal electoral success than
after a defeat. Second, elections following a female and an ethnic minority victory
are contested by a higher female and ethnic minority share of candidates than elec-
tions following a male/white victory. In the case of ethnic minorities, this increase
is driven by the personal advantage of the ethnic minority incumbent. Contrary to
the evidence from other countries, in the case of women the personal incumbency
2 Lee (2008) is the first example of a regression discontinuity design applied to the electoral
context. Examples of studies using RD-design and mixed-gender elections are Clots-Figueras (2011),
Clots-Figueras (2012), Bhalotra et al. (2017) and Brollo and Troiano (2014). Studies applying RD-
designs in interracial elections are more sporadic (see Vogl (2014) and Nye et al. (2014)).
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effect spills over to other women. When a woman’s seat is re-contested, a higher
share of women among new candidates run in the subsequent election. These new
women candidates run affiliated to a non-incumbent major party and are electorally
competitive. The differing results for women and ethnic minorities suggests that
these two groups face different challenges in attempting to enter the political arena.
Lastly, there is no evidence of incumbency spillovers to women or ethnic minorities
in nearby areas or to a higher level of government.
A growing body of work in economics studies the implication of ethnic mi-
nority and female political leadership on policy outcomes, attitudes and own-group
aspirations.3 This literature suggests that women and ethnic minorities’ under-
representation at higher and lower level of government can significantly shape - for
the worst - the economic performance of a country. Understanding the factors that
can foster political representation of women and ethnic minorities is therefore the
first step to reduce this outcome. This paper thus contributes to the existing body of
literature discussing barriers that women and ethnic minority face in attaining lead-
ership positions. Existing studies on how women respond to the competitive electoral
success of other women are to be found in Bhalotra et al. (2017) in the Indian state
legislative assembly elections, Broockman (2014) in the US state legislature elections,
and Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) in US mayoral elections. All these works provide
evidence of a positive effect on the share of women contesting subsequent elections,
primarily driven by the increased propensity of the incumbent woman to run again in
the following election.4 Very limited evidence currently exists on the effect of ethnic
minorities’ electoral success on the groups’ subsequent political representation. Vogl
(2014) documents that close black victories in southern US states are more likely
3 See for example Nye et al. (2014), and Ferrando and Gille (2017) for the effects of black leaders
on blacks’ labour market outcomes and educational achievements, respectively; see Gagliarducci and
Paserman (2012) for the effect of female leadership on the duration of legislature, Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004) on the quality and type of public goods delivered, Clots-Figueras (2012) on the
educational attainment of girls, Beaman et al. (2009) on attitudes towards women in leadership
positions, Brollo and Troiano (2014) on corruption.
4 Results from studies on the effect of increased female representation via affirmative action
(gender quotas) are relatively more encouraging. Bhavnani (2009) finds that the selection of women
as Indian village leaders via a quota policy improves women’s access to this position even after the
quota is removed. In a similar setting, Beaman et al. (2012) find that, after two terms of a women
as village leader, villagers’ confidence in female leaders’ competence improved and a higher share of
women contest elections. DePaola et al. (2010) finds a positive effect on female candidacy to Italian
local elections subsequent a temporary quota-system.
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than close black defeats to be followed by another black victory, while evidence out-
side the US is particularly scarce. The importance of race in the electoral context
is provided by Washington (2006), who shows that turnout increases when black
candidates contest an election in the US.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief
background to local elections in England. Section 2.3 illustrates the data used and
Section 2.4 presents the identification strategy. Section 2.5 presents descriptive statis-
tics. Section 2.6 discusses the validity of the regression discontinuity design and pro-
vides the main results, first for women and then for ethnic minorities. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Background to Local Government and Local Elec-
tions
Local councils spend £4bn of taxpayers’ money each year, almost a quarter of public
spending. They employ over 1.5 million people and provide a wide range of services,
from public education to waste collection. Local government is thought to have an
important effect on people’s lives: public awareness of local councils in England is
above that of other political institutions and people consider local authorities to be
more influential in everyday life than the central government (Ipsos MORI (2008)).
Even more importantly, local government is often considered an important avenue
for gaining practical experience in participating in politics before moving on to the
national arena.
Local councillors sit in local authorities councils, the lowest level of the British
Local Government and act as legislative bodies. There are 326 local authorities
in England: 201 shire districts (lower tier of two tiers), 55 unitary authorities, 36
metropolitan districts, 32 London boroughs and the special local authorities of the
City of London and Isles of Scilly. Shire district councils deal with public housing,
local planning and development applications, leisure and recreation facilities, waste
collection, environmental health and revenue collection. On top of these function,
unitary authorities, metropolitan districts and London boroughs councils deal with
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education, strategic planning, transport, highways, fire services, social services, public
libraries, and waste disposal.5
In the period examined, local authorities have adopted differing types of execu-
tive arrangements which set out how decisions are made within the council. The most
commonly adopted executive arrangements are the committee system and leader and
cabinet system. In both cases, the council elects a leader. Under the committee sys-
tem, the executive power is exercised by a series of committees formed by council
members in proportion to their parties’ representation. Under the leader and cabinet
system, the leader appoints members of the cabinet who are each responsible for a
specific policy area.6
The size of the council varies according to the local authority’s population: it
has an average of 49 seats and a standard deviation of 12 seats. Local authorities
are divided into wards (23 on average), which are the primary unit of the electoral
system. As of 2014, there were 7,707 wards in England, with a potential electorate
of about 5,500 people each. Each ward elects one, two or three councillors according
to its size.7
Candidates can run as independents or affiliates to a party. Each party nom-
inates candidates up to the maximum number of vacant seats, while the winning
candidate is selected via first past the post system. To be eligible, candidates must
be adult, British or citizens of the Commonwealth or European Union and having
ties with the local area.8 The frequency of Council renewal varies with the type of
5Local councils have four main sources of funding: central government grants, business rates (until
2013, collected by the government and re-distributed to councils), council tax (collected directly by
the local authorities), fees and charges on local council services.
6Since 2000, local authorities can also move to a system where instead of having a leader elected
by the council, a mayor is directly elected by the electorate.
7 To be completely accurate, in 1974-2014, in 1.21% elections, more than 3 seats have been
simultaneously contested. These elections were concentrated before 1979, while after 1980 only a
few wards in City of London and Isles of Scilly have elected more than 3 councillors. These wards
are excluded from the analysis.
8 Specifically, candidates have to be registered to vote in the Local Authority or have lived,
worked or owned property there for at least 12 months before an election. In addition, a person
cannot be a councillor if they work for the council they want to be a councillor for, or for another
local authority in a political restricted post; if they are the subject of a bankruptcy restrictions order
or interim order; if they have been sentenced to prison for three months or more (including suspended
sentences) during the 5 years before election day; have been convicted of a corrupt or illegal practice
by an election court. Furthermore, whether potential candidates have been selected by a party or
are standing as an independent candidate, they must make sure that they are officially nominated
by getting 10 people to sign their nomination papers - signatories must be registered electors in the
ward where they wish to stand.
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Local Authority. The three methods of holding elections to local councils are by
whole council (all the councillors are elected simultaneously every four years), as for
London boroughs; by halves (half of the councillors are elected every two years),
as for Metropolitan Districts and most Shire Districts; and by thirds (a third of the
councillors are elected every year for three years, with no elections in the fourth year),
as for some Shire Districts. There is no term limit for elected councillors, meaning
there is no maximum limit to the number of times they can re-run (and be elected)
for a seat on the council.
On election day, candidates appear on the ballot box in alphabetical order by
surname, along with the party symbol and their address (Figure 2.1). Councillors
are elected for a four-year term and they receive no salary for the time they devote to
serving their community. However, they do receive allowances to cover expenses. Es-
timates of the time commitment vary, ranging from 5 to 20 hours per week (Kettlewell
and Phillips (2014)).
2.3 Data
To study gender-mixed and interracial in British local elections, our paper uses an
original dataset spanning over 40 years. We rely on candidates’ names and surnames
to recover information about their gender and ethnicity. This section describes the
dataset used and the procedure followed to create the final dataset.
2.3.1 Local Election Data
This paper uses the Local Election Database 1889-2003 compiled by the Local Gov-
ernment Chronicle Elections Centre, University of Plymouth (Rallings et al. (2006)).
This database includes results from every local government election in Britain from
1973-2003, with information about ward and year in which the election was con-
tested, number of vacancies, size of the electorate, candidates’ surname, gender (but
not ethnicity), party, number of votes received and turnout. The paper complements
this dataset with data from the Local Archive Election Project which includes, for
every council election between 2004-2014, information on the name and surname of
each candidate, the party and number of votes received, the ward and year in which
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the election is contested and number of vacancies. Nonetheless, it does not provide
any information about candidates’ gender nor ethnicity. The turnout and size of the
electorate for years 2004-2014 come alternatively from the Electoral Commission or
they have been kindly provided by the Elections Centre, University of Plymouth.
Overall, the dataset includes 132,238 elections and 531,607 candidates.
2.3.2 Gender of Candidates
For elections contested before 2004, the Local Election Database provides information
on candidates’ gender. Hence, to assign gender to candidates contesting elections
after 2003, a step-wise procedure is followed, relying on candidates’ first name. First,
all given names are matched to the relative frequency of given names in the population
of new-borns in UK by gender in 1996-2016. Gender is assigned as the most frequent
gender: for example, the name Jamie is a female name for 75% of the times and a male
name for 25% of the times. According to the procedure, all candidates named Jamie
are recorded as female in the data, with a gender-accuracy score of 75%. Second,
names that do not have a match in the list (about 35%) are match to a similar list
of the population of U.S. births 1940-2016 where the individual has a Social Security
Number and a similar procedure applied. Third, given that most of the remaining
unmatched names were non-British sounding names, the matching also relies both
on the 40,000 Namen database (Michael (2007)) and on the Gender Api database.
Overall, gender cannot be assigned to less than 3% of the candidates contesting an
election in 2004-2014. Among names for which it has been possible to match the most
probable gender, more than 94% have an accuracy rate higher than 95%. Elections
for which one or more candidates have missing gender information are excluded from
the empirical analysis (4% of the elections held after 2003).9
2.3.3 Ethnicity of Candidates
To determine candidates’ ethnicity, the paper uses a software, Onolytics INC, that
ascribes ethnicity based on surnames. Onolytics INC10 name-classification system,
9In the Appendix, it is shown that the main result is similar when using exclusively data from
the Local Election Database, in which candidates’ gender is unambiguously determined (Table B.1,
col(1)).
10 Previously called OnoMap Inc.
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developed by researchers at University College London, relies on a reference popula-
tion of a million names from 28 countries for which ethnicity is known. Each candi-
date’s surname is matched with an ethnic category from 2011 census (White British,
White Irish, White - any other background, Asian - Indian, Asian - Pakistani, Asian
- Bangladeshi, Asian - Other, Black - Caribbean, Black - African, Chinese, Other)
according to the share of the reference population with that surname belonging to
each ethnic group. 11 Of the 41,572 unique surnames, the software successfully as-
cribes 98% of surnames to an ethic category. As for gender, the analysis in the paper
does not use elections with missing ethnicity information for one or more candidates
(about 6% of the elections). Candidates of non-white descent (here onwards also
defined with the acronym BME: Black and Minority Ethnic) are categorised as be-
longing to an ethnic minority. From 1973-2014, only 2.6% of candidates contesting a
local election belonged to an ethnic minority.
2.3.4 Auxiliary Data
The dataset on local elections is complemented with few other data sources. First, the
paper relies on the 1971 Census to recover exogenous local authority characteristics.
In particular, the paper uses i) the difference in male and female employment rate
to identify areas where women were historically more attached to the labour market;
ii) the share of individuals born in Commonwealth countries to identify areas with
a higher fraction of ethnic minority population. Second, the paper uses 2001-2015
General Elections data (candidates’ name and surname12, constituency name, party,
vote share) collected from a variety of sources. The paper relies on this data to
investigate spillovers to higher levels of government. Third, the paper uses data
on investigated electoral frauds (2010-2014) available on the Electoral Commission
website.
11For more details of the coding algorithm, see Mateos et al. (2007) and Mateos (2007) and Lakha
et al. (2011) for a validation of the algorithm.
12Candidates’ gender and ethnicity is inferred using candidates’ name and surname following the
methods described in the previous subsections.
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2.4 Econometric Model: RD Design
The empirical analysis’ objective is to test whether the electoral success of women
and ethnic minorities leads to subsequent increases in women’s and ethnic minorities’
representation as political candidates in local elections. The lack of randomised
assignment of individuals to council seats represents a threat to the identification
of a causal effect. For example, an ethnic minority candidate’s success might be
correlated with constituencies’ unobserved characteristics, such as ethnic composition
or attitudes towards diversity, that might influence ethnic minorities’ representation
as candidates and electoral success in subsequent elections.
The paper uses a regression discontinuity (RD) design to solve this problem,
focusing on gender-mixed and interracial elections. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first application of RD design to an electoral context in the UK.13 The following
paragraphs refer to mixed-gender elections, but the same idea applies to interracial
elections. According to the type of local authority, each electoral ward elects one to
three councillors at time, meaning that it is usually the case that multiple candidates
compete for multiple seats.14 For example, twelve candidates might simultaneously
compete for three seats, with the seats being assigned to the candidates with the three
highest vote shares. An election is classified as a mixed gender election based on the
gender of the last candidate who barely won a seat and the gender of the candidate
who barely lost a seat (marginal candidates). The race in the previous example would
be classified as mixed-gender if the gender of the candidate with the third highest vote
share were different from the fourth highest vote candidate’s gender. This implies
that wards where a woman narrowly won a seat in the local authority council are
compared to wards where a woman narrowly lost, independently of whether other
women won non-marginal seats (in the previous example, independently from the
gender of the two candidates with the highest vote shares).
13 Eggers et al. (2015) is the only other case found of RD design applied in a UK electoral setting.
Using the British Local Election Database and focusing exclusively on single-member elections, they
show that in this setting and in many others - excepting the U.S. House of Representatives - the
incumbent party does not have systematically greater chances of winning in close elections.
14Metropolitan districts elect three councillors, while wards in non-metropolitan district, unitary
authorities and London boroughs elect between one and three councillors. In the period 1974-2014,
in 66% of the elections one councillor is elected, in 17% two councillors are elected, and in the
remaining 17% three councillors are elected.
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Consistently, the running variable is computed as the difference between the
vote share received by a marginal woman and the vote share received by a marginal
man in a mixed-gender election.15 The identifying assumption is that the assign-
ment of treatment around the threshold (i.e. a woman winning rather than a man)
is uncorrelated with candidates’ and constituencies’ characteristics. The estimated
equation is the following:
Yi,c,t = α+ βFi,c,t−1 + f(mi,c,t−1) + εi,c,t (2.1)
where Yi,c,t is a measure of female political candidacy and performance in ward
i, local authority c in election t, such as the share of female candidates contesting the
election and the probability of a female win. f(mi,c,t−1) is a flexible function of the
margin of victory mi,c,t−1, that we allow to differ on each side at the discontinuity.
Fi,c,t−1 is a dummy that takes value one if a marginal woman had won against a
marginal man (female margin of victory mi,c,t−1 > 0) and zero otherwise. The
coefficient β can be interpreted as the causal impact of an additional woman winning
a council seat against a man on women’s representation in the subsequent election.16
Standard errors are clustered at the local authority-decade level to allow for correlated
outcomes across all wards within the same local authority by decade.
To test the sensitivity of the results, the paper adopts three approaches. First,
we estimate local linear regressions (Hahn et al. (2001), Imens and Lemieux (2008))
restricting the sample to a data-driven optimal bandwidth around the discontinu-
ity, with the optimal bandwidth selected by applying the mean square error (MSE)
method (Cattaneo et al. (2018)). Second, we estimate local linear regressions using
an optimal bandwidth selected by applying the coverage error rate (CER) method
15 Beach and Jones (2017) adopt a similar strategy in analysing the effect of ethnic diversity in
local government on public good provision in Californian city councils.
16 This design pools a larger number of constituency-specific RD design into one, by normalising the
running variable (vote margin). Each individual RD design is characterised by a different vote share
of the marginal winning candidate (because of multi-member elections) and of the marginal loser
(because of the presence of other non-marginal losers). The normalising and pooling technique is a
widespread practice in the empirical literature using RD in electoral contexts (see for example Beach
and Jones (2017), Broockman (2014), Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), Ferreira and Gyourko (2014),
Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), Lee (2008), Vogl (2014)). Cattaneo et al. (2016) point out that
this approach has implications for the interpretation of the RD parameter. With pooling, β can be
interpreted as a double average: the weighted average across cut-offs of the local average treatment
effects of all observations at each particular cut-off value. More weight is given to observations at
more frequent cut-off values.
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(Cattaneo et al. (2018)). These two alternative bandwidth choices involve a trade-off
between size and power of the hypothesis testing: MSE-optimal bandwidth leads
to more powerful hypothesis tests but includes observations that are relatively fur-
ther away from the cut-off with respect to tests implemented using the CER-optimal
bandwidth. Unless specified differently, these estimations adopt a triangular kernel
function, that assigns zero weight to all observations outside the bandwidth inter-
val and positive weight (symmetrically and linearly declining in the distance to the
cut-off) to observations within the interval. Third, we fit a quadratic function of
the vote margin mi,c,t−1. This specification includes local authorities interacted with
time fixed effect, which control for all local authorities’ fixed and time-varying char-
acteristics, such as the local authority’s ethnic composition or the political colour of
the council. Last, the paper investigates the robustness of results by experimenting
with different kernels and polynomial selections and by restricting the sample to a
very small window around the cut-off.
To examine geographical spillovers, Yi,c,t is replaced with Ȳc−i,t = Σ
J
j 6=iYi,c,t, the
average outcome in wards other than ward i within the same local authority c. To
investigate political spillovers to higher level of government, the dependent variable
in Equation (2.1) is replaced with Yi,p,t, the political representation in the next closest
General Elections in the constituency p in which the ward i is included.17
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
Despite local government in England often being characterised as ‘pale, male and
stale’, it has certainly experienced an upsurge in ethnic minorities and female repre-
sentation over time. Figure 2.2 depicts the increase in female and ethnic minorities’
representation in local elections from 1974 to 2014. The representation of women
steadily increased until mid-2000, when it reached around 33% (panel a), continuous
lines). Consistently, the fraction of women winning a seat in the local council has
increased from 8% in the 1970s to 10% in the 2000s (panel a), dashed lines). The
candidacy and political representation of ethnic minorities has also steadily increased
17 Despite covering smaller areas, electoral wards’ boundaries do not overlap precisely with the
boundaries of parliamentary constituencies. A ward is considered to be included in a parliamentary
constituency if the ward’s centroid falls within the parliamentary constituency borders.
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in the last four decades (panel b)) because of the increase in net migration and in
the political awareness of ethnic minorities. The oscillating trend depicted in the fig-
ure is explained by the fact that elections in different localities take place in different
years. The spikes in the fraction of BME candidates correspond to the years in which
elections were held in London Boroughs, where the share of ethnic minority residents
is particularly high.18
2.6 Regression Discontinuity Analysis
2.6.1 Validity of the RD Design
Before presenting the results, this section discusses the validity of the regression
discontinuity design. First, we test for internal validity, analysing the continuity of
the running variable and ensuring that constituencies’ or candidates’ characteristics
do not present a discontinuity at the zero cut-off. Second, we discuss the external
validity of the RD design in this context.
Internal validity
The paper presents here several tests of the validity of the regression discontinuity
design. The first test constitutes in analysing whether the running variable is contin-
uous at the zero threshold. The histogram of density of female and ethnic minority
margin of victory is displayed in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 (left panels), while the right pan-
els formally test for the presence of a discontinuity following McCrary (2008). There
is no indication of discontinuity around the zero threshold in the female margin of
victory. However, the ethnic minority margin of victory exhibits a discontinuity at
zero, suggesting that close victories are significantly more likely than close defeats
for ethnic minority candidates. The sorting observed around the threshold could be
the result of either ex ante (i.e. higher voter mobilisation or electoral frauds such
as ballot stuffing or votes’ suppression) or ex post manipulation (i.e. recounts or
lawsuits) of the ethnic minority vote share.19
18 40% of London population belongs to an ethnic minority, in contrast to 15% in the rest of
England (Census 2011). The differential pattern in BME candidacy and political representation for
London boroughs and council outside the capital is clearly depicted in Figure A.1 in the Appendix
19 Vogl (2014) observes that narrow black victories are significantly more likely than narrow black
losses in the US South. He argues that if the discontinuity is due to recounts or law suits (ex post
Chapter 2 54
Table B.2 in the Appendix tries to shed some light on the determinants of this
discontinuity. Columns (1) to (3) examine whether elections in which a BME candi-
date barely won are characterised by a higher turnout than elections in which a BME
candidate barely lost, using different econometric specifications. The hypothesis that
BME candidates can mobilise voters in competitive elections is not supported by
the data. Columns (4) to (6) investigate whether narrow BME victories are more
likely to be followed by investigations of cases of alleged electoral frauds by police
forces, finding no significant result either.20 In any case, manipulation of the running
variable in electoral context rarely lead to identification problems (McCrary (2008)).
This is because while candidates or parties may attempt to manipulate the vote tally,
it would be difficult to do so perfectly, particularly since elections are secret ballot.
An alternative explanation for the discontinuity is a bias introduced by the
surname-ethnicity algorithm. The algorithm categorises BME candidates with white-
sounding surnames as non-BME. This implies that the software fails to identify some
elections as interracial, i.e. those elections in which a marginal candidates belongs
to an ethnic minority but has a white sounding name. If BME candidates with a
white sounding name were more likely to be the marginal loser than the marginal
winner when contesting the marginal seat with a (truly) white candidate, one would
observe a “missing mass” to the left of the zero threshold in the BME victory margin.
However, this is not consistent with existing empirical evidence. Analysing British
local elections covering the same time span as this study, Thrasher et al. (2017) find
that candidates with names suggesting a non-European ethnic origin perform least
well compared to candidates with surnames indicating a British origin.
The second test for the internal validity of the regression discontinuity de-
sign constitutes in ensuring that constituencies’ or candidates’ characteristics do not
present a discontinuity at the zero cut-off. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show a number of
constituency characteristics and pre-determined electoral variables (year, ward in
manipulation), then the turnout rate should not differ between close black victories and close black
losses. Finding that turnout is significantly higher in narrow black victories than in narrow black
losses, he argues that ex ante black voter mobilisation drives the result. For a detailed explanation
of sorting in close elections and and application in the US House elections, see Caughey and Sekhon
(2011).
20 Alleged fraud cases related to general elections are excluded from the analysis. The results do
not change if the analysis is restricted to cases that resulted in an action from the police, or if alleged
frauds related to electoral campaigns are excluded.
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London, multi-member election, number of votes polled, election by thirds, number
of female/ethnic minority candidates, total share of votes won by the Labour party
and contextual turnout) by the female and ethnic minority victory margin respec-
tively. The dots represent unconditional means of the relevant characteristic in bins
of 5% by the running variable. The solid line represents the predicted values of a
global 4th-order smoother estimated using raw data on each side of the zero thresh-
old. Looking at Figure 2.5, these variables do not vary discontinuously at the zero
threshold of the female margin of victory. This result lends additional credibility
to the identification strategy: RD results cannot be driven by different pre-existing
characteristics across constituencies in which a woman barely won and barely lost
an election. Additionally, panels i) and j) show that, in multi-member elections,
characteristics of non-marginal winners do not vary discontinuously at the threshold.
Lastly, the incumbency status of women who narrowly lost is similar to the incum-
bency status of women who narrowly won (panel k)) and their probability of running
with the Labour Party too (panel l).21 The formal statistical analysis reported in
Table 2.1 confirms the results of the graphical analysis. None of the characteristics
examined here exhibits a discontinuity at the threshold.22 Figure 2.6 explores the
continuity of these variables around the zero threshold for the BME margin of victory.
The graphical analysis suggest that some variables may vary discontinuously around
the cut-off - namely panel e) share of female candidates, panel i) share of women
among non marginal elected candidates, panel l) probability that the winner is a
Labour party candidate. The formal statistical analysis reported in Table 2.2 shows
that discontinuity in the probability that the BME candidate runs for the Labour
Party candidate is statistically significant. This means that, in elections where an
ethnic minority candidate narrowly wins a seat in the local council against a white
ethnicity candidate, it is more likely that the BME candidates is Labour. Hence,
to account for this difference, the main empirical analysis controls for whether the
marginal ethnic minority candidate run for the Labour Party in the previous election.
21 Historically, both women and ethnic minorities have been targeted by the Labour Party as
voters and candidates (Norris (1999), Anwar (2001)).
22 Using CER-optimal bandwidth instead of MSE-optimal bandwidth does not affect the results.
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External validity
The tests presented in the previous subsection corroborate the causal interpretation
of the β parameter estimates in Equation (2.1). However, as in many RD settings,
this effect may not be representative of the treatment effect that would occur for units
farther away from the cut-off, i.e. for elections with high/low margin of victory. For
example, a potential threat to the external validity of the estimated can be inspected
in Figure 2.5, Panel c), d) and e). Close mixed-gender elections are more likely to
occur in multi-member elections, where a high number of votes are cast and where
the share of women contesting the election is low. This finding indicates that the RD
effect estimates may not be informative of the average effect of treatment when the
female margin of victory is very far from zero. However, results obtained using the
whole sample of mixed-gender elections are very similar to RD results relying on the
sub-sample of observation around the cut-off, pointing towards the external validity
of the results.
A second threat to external validity comes from the focus on mixed gender/interracial
elections, as these elections may not be representative of all the elections. Mixed-
gender elections are 34% of the total, while interracial elections are 9% of the election
held in London and 2.5% of the elections held outside the capital. Between 1973-
2014, all local authorities experience at least one mixed gender election. However,
they are more likely to happen in London boroughs wards and in more recent years.
Meanwhile, 10% of local authorities never experienced an interracial election in their
wards in the period. Interracial elections are more likely to happen in wards charac-
terised by a wider electorate, in London boroughs and in unitary authorities and in
the last decade.
2.6.2 Women’s Electoral Success and Subsequent Political Repre-
sentation
This section investigates whether a woman candidate’s electoral success causes an
increase in the share of female candidates contesting the next election and tests the
robustness of the result to different RD specifications. First, we investigate the per-
sonal incumbency advantage of women; second, we test whether this advantage spills
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over to other women; third, we investigate the role of voters, parties and heterogene-
ity to area characteristics. Last, we analyse potential spillovers to nearby areas and
to higher levels of government.
Subsequent Female Candidacy in Local Elections
The incumbency advantage reflects the benefits that come with office-holding: in-
creased access to the local media, influence in the party’s local branches, opportunity
to deliver goods and services to the constituency and build a (positive) reputation.23
Table 2.3 shows that incumbent women enjoy a personal incumbency advantage in
terms of the probability of re-running (col. (1)) and re-election (col. (3)): women
who narrowly won against a man are more likely to re-run and be re-elected than
women who have narrowly lost against a man. However, women who have won a close
election against a man do not appear to be more likely to re-run and be re-elected
than men who narrowly won against a woman (col. (2) and (3)).
Female incumbency is a crucial factor for increasing women’s political candidacy
and therefore their chances of election. This has been shown by Ferreira and Gyourko
(2014), Broockman (2014), Bhalotra et al. (2017). Table 2.4 col. (1) shows that this
is the case for British local elections too. The election of a marginal women in a
close election, compared to the election of a marginal man, leads to an increase of
8.5 percentage points in the share of woman contesting the seat in the next local
election. More importantly, col. (2) shows that the increase in female candidacy
observed following a female victory is not entirely driven by the personal incumbency
effect. When the previous election has seen a female candidate winning against a
man, the share of women is also significantly higher among candidates who never
contested a race before. Hence, electorally successfully women cause an inflow of
new women contesting the next election. Figure 2.7 gives a graphical representation
of the effect, clearly showing a positive jump in the share of female candidates (panel
a)) at the zero threshold of the female victory margin. This effect is robust to
differed RD specifications, as shown in panels b) and c). Robustness to additional
specifications is reported in Table B.1, panel a) in the Appendix. Focusing on a sub-
23 See Erikson (2016) for a recent and comprehensive review of the incumbency advantage literature
in the US.
Chapter 2 58
sample of elections in which gender is unambiguously assigned to candidates (col.
(1)), different kernel choice (col. (2) and (3)), smaller bandwidth selection (col. (4)),
different polynomial order (col(5) and (6)) leaves the result substantially unaffected.
The fact that the total number of new candidates remains unaffected (Table
2.4 col. (3), negative but not significant coefficient in RD specifications), while the
number of female new candidates significantly increases (col. (4)), indicates that
female candidates substitute male candidates on the ballot list.
The results in Table 2.5 indicate that the increase in female new candidacies
observed following a female victory is of competitive candidates (col. (1)) who mostly
run affiliated to a major party (Conservative, LibDem or Labour) (col. (3)). Col. (4)
indicates that the share of women among new candidates running with the incumbent
party is only marginally affected; it is mainly non-incumbent parties that increase the
share of new female candidates on the ballot list. The fraction of new independent
female candidates does not respond to previous female victories (col. (2)). The results
are consistent with a proactive role of parties in recruiting more new, competitive
women who can potentially challenge the female incumbent.
Voters, Parties and Heterogeneous Effects
This subsection investigates whether the female representation effect found can be ex-
plained by demand-side factors such as voters’ and parties’ attitudes towards female
candidates. Table 2.6, panel a), col. (1)-(4) uses turnout and women’s electoral per-
formance as proxies for voters’ attitudes. Turnout is not significantly higher in wards
in which a woman won a marginal seat against a man in the preceding election.24
There is little evidence that women’s electoral performance (on top of incumbency
advantage) is significantly higher in wards when a woman previously won against a
man (Table 2.6, col. (2)-(4)). The share of women among new elected is significantly
higher when when their candidacy follows a female victory in the previous election
(col. (2)). However, each new woman does not receive a higher share of votes (col.
(4)). Figure 2.7, panel b) gives a graphical representation of the effect on the prob-
24 Unfortunately, turnout by gender is not available. It cannot be ruled out that women have a
higher turnout, as they are more encouraged to cast their votes when more women appear on the
ballot list, while the opposite happens to men, with the two effects off-setting each-other.
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ability of election for women among new candidates and Table B.1, panel b) in the
Appendix shows the robustness of this result to different econometric specification.
Table 2.6, panel b) investigates the heterogeneity of these results to women’s his-
torical labour force participation. Local authorities that, according to 1971 Census,
were below (above) the mean in terms of male-female employment rate differential
are considered localities where women have a less traditional gender role, i.e. they
participate more similarly to men to the labour market.25 No differential effect is to
be found with respect to candidacy (col. (1) and (2)). In local authorities charac-
terised by a more even men-women labour force participation, voters seem to reward
more new women after a female victory, than voters in local authorities characterised
by a more gender unbalanced labour force participation (col (3) versus col. (4)).
This suggests that a social context that promotes more equal gender roles leads to a
stronger response after a woman demonstrates the ability to win an election.
Last, Table 2.6, panel c) examines the role of parties in selecting female candi-
dates. The female candidacy and performance effect among new candidates seems
to be driven by parties who are not led by a woman (i.e. the Conservative Party
when not led by Margaret Thatcher and any party outside of the period 1975-1990).
However, differences in coefficients are not statistically significant.
Other Spillover Effects
Table 2.7 empirically tests two potential spillover effects. First, it investigates whether
a marginal female win in a ward leads to a higher representation as candidates and
success in subsequent elections held in nearby wards (col. (1)-(2)). Second, it asks
whether a marginal female win in the local council translates into a higher share of
women running for general elections in the future (col. (3)-(4)). The results do not
provide evidence in support of spillover effects.
25 Using attitudinal data from 1998-2008 British Household Survey, the share of respondents
agreeing to the statement “Woman and family are happier if she works” / disagreeing with the
statement “The family suffers if the woman works full time” negatively correlates with 1971 male-
female employment rate differentials in unconditional regressions. This suggests that the 1971 male-
female employment rate differential has some power in explaining gender norms about 30-40 years
later.
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2.6.3 Ethnic Minorities’ Electoral Success and Subsequent Political
Representation
This section presents the results of the analysis carried out for ethnic minority can-
didates. In addition to providing insights into another politically under-represented
group, this section sheds additional light on the mechanisms that can explain female
representation in leadership positions. If similar results to the analysis for women are
to be found, female under-representation is unlikely to be due only to gender-specific
factors, such as lack of confidence, distaste for competition (Gneezy et al. (2003)) or
family duties.
Table 2.8 confirms that BME winners enjoy an incumbency effect in terms of
future candidacy and re-election probability (col. (1) and (2)). Similar to women,
winning BME candidates are equally as likely as white winning candidates to re-run
and be re-elected, conditional on their re-running (col. (3) and (4)). The incumbency
effect enjoyed by winning BME candidates enjoy causes elections subsequent a BME
victory in a close interracial election to have a higher fraction of BME candidates on
the ballot list (Table 2.9, col. (1)). However, differently to women, this advantage
does not “spill-over” to other similar candidates. Col. (2)-(4) shows that the increase
in the share of BME candidates is not driven by an inflow of new BME candidates.
Consistently, Figure 2.8, panel a), shows that the share of BME new candidates does
not exhibit a jump in correspondence to the zero-threshold in the share of the BME
candidate’s victory margin in the previous election.
Table B.3 in the Appendix shows that neither the share of BME among new
competitive candidates, independent nor affiliated to major parties (incumbent and
not) is affected. Table B.4, panel a) further illustrates that voters do not respond to
a BME victory in terms of higher turnout (Col. (1), or higher BME share of new
elected candidates (Col. (2) and (3); graphically shown in Figure 2.8, panel b)).26
Panel b) investigates whether local authorities with high ethnic minority presence in
1971 exhibit a higher response to a BME electoral victory. However, the results do not
support the hypothesis that elections held in local authorities with a high minority
26 No major political party has ever been headed by an ethnic minority leader in Britain, limiting
the scope of this investigation only to voters’ behaviour.
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share react more to a BME electoral victory in terms of new BME candidates running
or being elected in a subsequent election.
Lastly, Table 2.10 investigates potential geographical and political spillovers. A
BME close victory in an interracial close election does not affect the share of BME
candidates running or elected in other wards in the same local authority (col. (1)
and (2)). With respect to spillovers to other types of elections, results indicate that
a close BME victory in marginal elections does not trigger higher BME participation
as candidates nor higher electoral success in subsequent general elections in the same
area (col. (3) and (4)).
Overall, the analysis carried out for ethnic minority candidates provides differ-
ent results to the one for female candidates. This suggests that women and ethnic
minority face significantly different challenges when they seek to enter local poli-
tics. Existing survey evidence supports this claim. In a survey of local elections’
candidates, Rallings et al. (2015) finds the majority of candidates agrees that the
explanation for women’s under-recruitment is that women put family above political
career. Women’s responsibilities in the home and to the family appear to be gender-
specific concrete obstacles to recruitment. On the other hand, they find that lack
of parties’ effort in recruiting BME candidates is thought to be the main reason for
BME under-representation as candidates.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether the electoral success of women and ethnic minorities
leads to subsequent increases in these groups’ representation in elections as political
candidates. In doing so, it focuses on the universe of mixed gender and interra-
cial local elections in England spanning over 40 years. Causal effects are estimated
using a regression discontinuity design, that compares outcomes in wards where a
woman/BME candidate narrowly won a council seat to outcomes in wards where a
woman/BME narrowly lost. Many checks are provided to ensure both the validity of
the design and the robustness of the estimates.
The electoral success of an individual from a politically under-represented group
can affect future political engagement of members of the same group if it helps re-
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ducing stereotypes towards the ability of these groups as political leaders among
voters, parties and potential candidates themselves. The evidence provided by this
paper partially confirms this hypothesis. The analysis confirms that both women and
ethnic minorities enjoy a personal incumbency advantage, as men and white candi-
dates. One direct consequence of the incumbency advantage is a large and significant
increase in the fraction of women and ethnic minority candidates contesting a local
election, where previously the seat was won by somebody from the same group. Addi-
tional results show that, in the case of women, this increase can also be attributed to
an inflow of new candidates. These new candidates are both electorally competitive
and mainly recruited by non-incumbent major parties.
These results provide three insights. First, that women and ethnic minority
face significantly different challenges when attempting to enter the political arena.
Second, that affirmative actions aimed at increasing female representation in lead-
ership positions can be of use in breaking down stereotypes against women and can
potentially have a trickle-down effect on subsequent elections. Third, that the idea
that more political representation leads to even more political representation does not
apply to every under-represented group. In the case of ethnic minorities, additional
incentives may be needed. Such possible measures may include guidance to political
parties to ensure that there is no discrimination in the selection of candidates and
pro-active campaigning to encourage ethnic minorities to stand as councillors.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Ballot paper examples
Notes: Ballot paper for Ladywell ward, Lewisham, London (election held on 22nd May 2014), on
the left;ballot paper for New Cross ward, Lewisham, London (election held on 6th May 2010), on
the right. In both cases, three seats were vacant.
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Figure 2.2: Electoral representation and performance
(a) Women (b) Ethnic minorities
Notes: Panel a) shows the fraction of female candidates contesting local elections and fraction of
female winners per year (1973-2014); Panel b) shows the fraction of ethnic minority candidates
contesting local elections per year and fraction of ethnic minority winners per year (1973-2014).
Figure 2.3: Continuity of female margin of victory
(a) Histogram (b) Mc Crary (2008) discontinuity test
Notes: The sample includes all mixed-gender elections during 1973-2014. Discontinuity estimate in
Panel b) (Log difference in height): 0.013 (SE: 0.030)
Chapter 2 65
Figure 2.4: Continuity of BME margin of victory
(a) Histogram (b) Mc Crary (2008) discontinuity test
Notes: The sample includes all interracial elections during 1973-2014. Discontinuity estimate in
Panel b) (Log difference in height): 0.189 (SE: 0.094)
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Figure 2.5: Continuity of covariates at zero-threshold of female margin of victory
(a) Year of the election (b) Share of elections held in London
(c) Multi-member elections (d) Votes cast
(e) Share of female candidates (f) Share of BME candidates
(g) Labour votes (h) Turnout
Chapter 2 67
Figure 2.5: (continued) Continuity of covariates at zero-threshold of female margin
of victory
(i) Share of women among non-marginal
elected candidates
(j) Share of BME among non-marginal elected
candidates
(k) Incumbency status (l) Labour party
Notes: Panels show a number of constituency characteristics, pre-determined electoral variables and
candidates’ characteristics by female victory margin respectively. All dots represent unconditional
means of the relevant characteristic in bins of 5% by the running variable. The solid line represents
the predicted values of a global 4th-order smoother estimated using raw data on each side of the
zero threshold.
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Figure 2.6: Continuity of covariates at zero-threshold of BME margin of victory
(a) Year of the election (b) Share of elections held in London
(c) Multi-member elections (d) Votes cast
(e) Share of female candidates (f) Share of BME candidates
(g) Labour votes (h) Turnout
Chapter 2 69
Figure 2.6: (continued) Continuity of covariates at zero-threshold of BME margin of
victory
(i) Share of women among non-marginal
elected candidates
(j) Share of BME among non-marginal elected
candidates
(k) Incumbency status (l) Labour party
Notes: Panels show a number of constituency characteristics, pre-determined electoral variables
and candidates’ characteristics by ethnic minority victory margin respectively. All dots represent
unconditional means of the relevant characteristic in bins of 5% by the running variable. The solid
line represents the predicted values of a global 4th-order smoother estimated using raw data on each
side of the zero threshold.
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Figure 2.7: RD Estimate for new women’s candidacy and performance in subsequent
election
(a) Share of female new candidates
(b) Share women among new elected candi-
dates
Notes: All dots represent unconditional means of the relevant characteristic in bins of 5% by the
running variable. The solid line represents the predicted values of a global 4th-order smoother
estimated using raw data on each side of the zero threshold.
Figure 2.8: RD Estimate for new BME’s candidacy and performance in subsequent
election
(a) Share of BME candidates (b) Share BME among elected candidates
Notes: Notes: All dots represent unconditional means of the relevant characteristic in bins of 5% by
the running variable. The solid line represents the predicted values of a global 4th-order smoother
estimated using raw data on each side of the zero threshold.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Formal continuity-based analysis for covariates by female victory margin
VARIABLES RD estimate SE Bandwidth Effective Obs.
a) Year -0.458 (0.328) 0.172 7976 ; 7461
b) Ward in London -0.008 (0.029) 0.188 8418 ; 7861
c) Multi-member election -0.006 (0.026) 0.146 7181 ; 6776
d) Votes cast -145.1 (176.5) 0.223 9297 ; 8638
f) Share of female candidates 0.010 (0.005) 0.171 7933 ; 7419
g) Share of BME candidates 0.000 (0.003) 0.244 9083 ; 8381
h) Labour votes -0.002 (0.010) 0.169 7890 ; 7368
i) Turnout -0.602 (0.724) 0.184 8279 ; 7760
j)
Share of women among elected
-0.001 (0.031) 0.053 1231 ; 1118
non-marginal candidates
k)
Share of BME among elected
-0.004 (0.009) 0.048 1163 ; 1060
non-marginal candidates
l) Incumbency status -0.003 (0.014) 0.118 6140 ; 5891
m) Labour party -0.018 (0.023) 0.144 4120 ; 3852
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample
includes all mixed gender elections in years 1973-2014. MSE-Optimal bandwidth, Triangular Kernel.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.2: Formal continuity-based analysis for covariates by BME victory margin
VARIABLES RD estimate SE Bandwidth Effective Obs.
a) Year -1.038 (1.064) 0.117 464 ; 592
b) Ward in London 0.047 (0.058) 0.165 576 ; 744
c) Multi-member election -0.024) (0.051 0.140 518 ; 678
d) Votes cast 601.3 (291.0) (0.176 601 ; 772
f) Share of female candidates -0.020 (0.021) 0.153 533 ; 693
g) Share of BME candidates -0.008 (0.017) 0.167 580 ; 753
h) Labour votes -0.007 (0.016) 0.170 587 ; 759
i) Turnout 0.518 (1.476) 0.172 590 ; 764
j)
Share of women among elected
-0.081 (0.094) 0.057 124 ; 186
non-marginal candidates
k)
Share of BME among elected
0.090 (0.082) 0.038 101 ; 150
non-marginal candidates
l) Incumbency status 0.018 (0.035) 0.159 564 ; 727
m) Labour party 0.152** (0.053) 0.197 518 ; 672
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample
includes all interracial elections in years 1973-2014. MSE-Optimal bandwidth, Triangular Kernel.
Robust p-value for BME being a Labour party candidate: 0.022. *** p<0.01; **
Table 2.3: Gender and personal incumbency effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbency effect Incumbency effect Incumbency effect Incumbency effect
on candidacy on winning prob. on candidacy on winning prob.
among women among women of women vs men of women vs men
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
Female winner 0.249*** 0.341*** 0.015 0.022
(0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025)
Observations 6523 ; 6212 2410 ; 2334 7938 ; 7403 2974 ; 2881
Bandwidth 0.126 0.116 0.168 0.158
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
Female winner 0.247*** 0.330*** 0.010 0.021
(0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.029)
Observations 4641 ; 4527 1762 ; 1738 5769 ; 5535 2229 ; 2161
Bandwidth 0.080 0.076 0.107 0.103
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
Female winner 0.288*** 0.436*** 0.019* 0.022
(0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.019)
Observations 28,326 11,406 28,326 11,406
Note: Col. (1) and (2) compare probability of re-running for a council seat and probability of winning
a council seat for a woman who won a close election against a man to the same probabilities for a
woman who lost a close election against a man. Col. (3) and (4) compare probability of rerunning
and re-election for a woman who won a close election against a man to the same probabilities for
a man who won a close election against a woman. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered
at the local authority-decade level. Sample includes all mixed gender elections in years 1973-2014.
Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: Effect on women’s candidacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Share of N of N of new
female female new female
candidates new candidates candidates candidates
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
Female winner 0.085*** 0.027*** -0.066 0.065*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.073) (0.036)
Observations 7494 ; 7030 8823 ; 8187 7353 ; 6914 7103 ; 6678
Bandwidth 0.156 0.211 0.149 0.144
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
Female winner 0.083*** 0.030*** -0.052 0.067
(0.008) (0.009) (0.084) (0.043)
Observations 5403 ; 5209 6605 ; 6239 5275 ; 5091 5071 ; 4912
Bandwidth 0.099 0.134 0.095 0.091
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
Female winner 0.090*** 0.022*** -0.059* 0.057**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.032) (0.023)
Observations 28,084 27,128 28,315 28,084
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample
includes all mixed gender elections in years 1973-2014. New candidates are candidates who did not
contest the council seat in the previous election. Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. ***
p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.5: Subsequent female candidacies’ characteristics: competitive, party affilia-
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of women Share of women Share of women Share of women
among new among new among new among new
competitve independent major parties’ candidates from
candidates candidates candidates incumbent party
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
Female winner 0.025*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.037*
(0.008) (0.031) (0.009) (0.017)
Observations 8657 ; 8026 1079 ; 993 7768 ; 7211 4049 ; 3675
Bandwidth 0.205 0.186 0.176 0.132
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
Female winner 0.027*** 0.013 0.035*** 0.035
(0.009) (0.035) (0.010) (0.019)
Observations 6453 ; 6112 859 ; 827 5709 ; 5416 2978 ; 2769
Bandwidth 0.130 0.126 0.112 0.085
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
Female winner 0.023*** -0.040 0.025*** 0.055***
(0.008) (0.038) (0.008) (0.015)
Observations 27,062 1,976 26,530 14,785
Note: New candidates are candidates who did not contest the council seat in the previous election.
Competitive candidates are candidates who received at least 5% of votes. Major parties are the Con-
servative Party, LibDem Party and Labour party. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered
at the local authority-decade level. Sample includes all mixed gender elections in years 1973-2014.
Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Voters’ and parties’ behaviour
Panel a) Voters’ behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one Share of women Avg share of
Turnout new woman among new votes by
elected elected new women
Female winner -0.257 0.025 0.036** 0.006
(0.507) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006)
Observations 8985 ; 8340 5258 ; 4854 5265 ; 4859 4859 ; 4650
Bandwidth 0.208 0.150 0.150 0.153
Panel b) Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of women among new candidates: Share of women among new elected:
∆Men−Women labour force ∆Men−Women labour force
participation, 1971 participation, 1971
Low High Low High
Female winner 0.035*** 0.025** 0.043** 0.025
0.011 0.012 0.020 0.021
Observations 3989 ; 3656 3934 ; 3710 2816 ; 2532 2726 ; 2527
Bandwidth 0.181 0.176 0.165 0.161
Panel c) Role of parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of women among new candidates Share of women among new elected
Thatcher No Thatcher Thatcher No Thatcher
Female winner 0.002 0.027*** 0.023 0.038***
0.030 0.009 0.051 0.019
Observations 1060 ; 1105 8867 ; 8168 416 ; 423 3354 ; 3260
Bandwidth 0.182 0.231 0.190 0.155
Note: New candidates are candidates who did not contest the council seat in the previous election.
Men-Women differential labour force participation is measured as difference in the share of population
in employment by gender, according to 1971 Census. Margaret Thatcher led the Conservative Party
from 1975 to 1990. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade
level. Sample includes all mixed gender elections in years 1973-2014. RD regressions bandwidth
type: MSE-optimal, kernel type: Triangular. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.7: Spillovers of female close win
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wards in same LA General elections
Share of female Share of female Share of female Share of female
candidates winners candidates winners
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
Female winner -0.001 -0.008 0.008 0.002
(0.002) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 8286 ; 7745 7600 ; 7133 3070 ; 2750 2648 ; 2416
Bandwidth 0.181 0.157 0.177 0.140
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
Female winner -0.001 -0.011 0.014 0.005
(0.001) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006)
Observations 5374 ; 5177 4987 ; 4836 2253 ; 2086 1888 ; 1770
Bandwidth 0.097 0.088 0.112 0.088
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
Female winner 0.001 -0.002 0.007 -0.003
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Observations 28,607 28,607 10,101 10,101
Note: A ward is considered to be included in a parliamentary constituency if the centroid of the
ward falls within the parliamentary constituency borders. Robust standard errors in parenthesis,
clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all mixed gender
elections in years 1973-2014; sample in columns (3) and (4) includes 2001, 2004, 2009, 2014 General
Elections. Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.8: Ethnicity and personal incumbency effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbency effect Incumbency effect Incumbency effect Incumbency effect
on candidacy on winning prob. on candidacy on winning prob.
among BME among BME of BME vs non BME of BME vs non BME
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.295*** 0.498*** -0.007 0.151
(0.041) (0.090) (0.049) (0.095)
Observations 548 ; 710 149 ; 200 561 ; 721 189 ; 254
Bandwidth 0.151 0.148 0.156 0.225
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.278*** 0.443*** -0.021 0.098
(0.046) (0.102) (0.056) (0.109)
Observations 425 ; 525 119 ; 152 434 ; 548 153 ; 217
Bandwidth 0.104 0.107 0.108 0.163
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
BME winner 0.308*** 0.640*** -0.006 0.092
(0.047) (0.078) (0.050) (0.112)
Observations 1,525 367 1,525 367
Note: Col. (1) and (2) compare probability of re-running for a council seat and probability of
winning a council seat for a BME politician who won a close election against a non-BME to the
same probabilities for a BME who lost a close election against a non-BME. Col. (3) and (4) compare
probability of rerunning and re-election for a BME who won a close election against a non-BME to
the same probabilities for a non-BME who won a close election against a BME. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample includes all mixed gender
elections in years 1973-2014. All regressions include a dummy for BME running with Labour party
in previous election. Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2.9: Effect on BMEs’ candidacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Share of N of N of new
BME BME new BME
candidates new candidates candidates candidates
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.068** 0.051 -0.072 0.092
0.029 0.038 0.299 0.167
Observations 482 ; 605 358 ; 468 418 ; 549 517 ; 629
Bandwidth 0.214 0.136 0.138 0.237
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.081** 0.070 -0.185 0.118
0.033 0.044 0.345 0.195
Observations 378 ; 505 279 ; 360 329 ; 409 403 ; 537
Bandwidth 0.150 0.095 0.096 0.166
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
BME winner 0.036 0.002 0.125 -0.074
(0.027) (0.032) (0.187) (0.177)
Observations 1,105 1,102 1,304 1,105
Note: New candidates are candidates who did not contest the council seat in the previous election.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample includes
all interracial elections in years 1973-2014. All regressions include a dummy for BME running with
Labour party in previous election. Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. *** p<0.01; **
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 2.10: Spillovers of BME close win
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wards in same LA General elections
Share of BME Share of BME Share of BME Share of BME
candidates winners candidates winners
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.003** -0.001 -0.001 0.002
0.002 0.014 0.030 0.006
Observations 436 ; 581 520 ; 673 294 ; 363 363 ; 409
Bandwidth 0.149 0.198 0.159 0.230
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.003 -0.004 0.008 0.001
0.002 0.016 0.036 0.007
Observations 342 ; 429 419 ; 551 234 ; 288 298 ; 367
Bandwidth 0.104 0.138 0.115 0.166
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
BME winner 0.001 0.002 0.020 0.003
(0.001) (0.008) (0.020) (0.005)
Observations 1,929 1,929 1,049 1,049
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample
includes all interracial elections in years 1973-2014. All regressions include a dummy for BME
running with Labour party in previous election. Kernel type in RD regressions: Triangular. ***
p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Appendices
A Appendix: Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Electoral representation and performance
(a) Women (b) Ethnic minorities
Notes: Panel a) shows the fraction of female candidates contesting local elections and fraction of
female winners per year (1973-2014). Panel b) shows the fraction of ethnic minority candidates
contesting local elections per year and fraction of ethnic minority winners per year (1973-2014). Red
lines refer to elections contested in London Metropolitan boroughs, blue lines in local authorities
outside London.
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B Appendix: Additional Tables
Table B.1: Effect on new women’s candidacy and performance - Robust to different
different sample, polynomials and bandwidth selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel a) Share of women among new candidates
Female winner 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030* 0.027*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 6956 ; 6346 7268 ; 6828 5256 ; 5050 3152 ; 3077 27,120 27,120
Bandwidth 0.207 0.154 0.098 0.050 1 1
Panel b) Share of women among new elected candidates
Female winner 0.038** 0.038** 0.039** 0.0414 0.047*** 0.045**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 4398 ; 4021 4395 ; 4150 3196 ; 3086 2426 ; 2362 17,745 17,745
Bandwidth 0.158 0.115 0.074 0.050 1 1
KernelType Triangular Uniform Uniform Triangular
BW Type MSE MSE CER Manual
Polynomial 3nd order 4nd order
LA x year FE yes yes
Sample RD; Restrict RD RD Full Full Full
to 1973-2003
Note: New candidates are candidates who did not contest the council seat in the previous elec-
tion. Col. (1) focuses on the sub-sample of elections in which gender is unambiguously assigned
to candidates (years 1973-2003). Col. (2) and (3) report the estimates from a RD regression using
MSE-optimal and CER-optimal bandwidth with uniform kernel, respectively. Col. (3) restricts the
bandwidth further, to a symmetric window of 5% margin of victory to each side of the cut-off. Col.
(6) fits a quadratic function of the margin of victory, varying at each side of the cut-off, and con-
trols for year times local authority fixed effects. Col (7) and (8) adopt a similar strategy, varying
the order of the fitted polynomial. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local
authority-decade level. Sample includes all mixed gender elections in years 1973-2014. *** p<0.01;
** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table B.2: Discontinuity in density of BME victory margin in London elections -
mobilisation or electoral frauds?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnout Turnout Turnout Fraud Rate Fraud Rate Fraud Rate
BME winner 0.498 0.896 0.657 -0.005 -0.007 0.003
(1.478) (1.649) (1.124) (0.017) (0.019) (0.004)
Observations 590 ; 764 467 ; 603 2,329 15 ; 20 15 ; 19 81
BW Type MSE CER MSE CER
Bandwidth 0.172 0.118 1 0.025 0.021 1
Polynomial Linear Linear 2nd order Linear Linear 2nd order
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is contextual turnout; in columns (4)-(6) it is the
fraud rate in the local authority-year in which the election is held, computed as the number of cases
investigated by police forces in that area-year divided by the number of elections held in the area-
year. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample in
columns (1)-(3) includes all interracial elections held in years 1973-2014; sample in columns (4)-(6)
includes all interracial elections in years 2010-2014. Data on alleged electoral frauds come from the
Electoral Commission website and are available only from 2010. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table B.3: Subsequent BME candidacies’ characteristics: competitive, party affilia-
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of BME Share of BME Share of BME Share of BME
among new among new among new among new
competitve independent major parties’ candidates from
candidates candidates candidates incumbent party
Panel a) RD, local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.051 0.046 0.003 0.061
0.051 0.046 0.035 0.056
Observations 347 ; 453 50 ; 67 485 ; 614 266 ; 404
Bandwidth 0.128 0.185 0.227 0.196
Panel b) RD, local linear regression with CER-optimal bandwidth
BME winner 0.078 0.044 0.019 0.074
0.050 0.154 0.040 0.061
Observations 269 ; 340 45 ; 60 388 ; 516 228 ; 337
Bandwidth 0.090 0.142 0.159 0.140
Panel c) Quadratic polynomials in the running variable, LA x year FE
BME winner 0.018 0.111 -0.044 0.065
(0.039) (0.266) (0.039) (0.075)
Observations 1,092 45 1,094 533
Note: New candidates are candidates who did not contest the council seat in the previous election.
Competitive candidates are candidates who received at least 5% of votes. Major parties are the Con-
servative Party, LibDem Party and Labour party. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered
at the local authority-decade level. Sample includes all interracial elections in years 1973-2014. All
regressions include a dummy for BME running with Labour party in previous election. Kernel type
in RD regressions: Triangular. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table B.4: Voters’ behaviour and heterogeneity
Panel a) Voters’ behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one Share of BME Avg share of
Turnout new BME among new votes by
elected elected new BME
BME winner -0.076 0.034 -0.083 0.038*
1.487 0.064 0.157 0.023
Observations 397 ; 512 337 ; 464 366 ; 484 165 ; 247
Bandwidth 0.125 0.229 0.259 0.139
Panel b) Ethnic minority presence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of BME among new candidates: Share of BME among new elected:
High minority LAs Low minority LAs High minority LAs Low minority LAs
BME winner 0.017 -0.013 -0.199 -0.202
0.040 0.051 0.201 0.143
Observations 264 ; 396 129 ; 131 239 ; 364 77 ; 71
Bandwidth 0.174 0.142 0.258 0.117
Note: New candidates are candidates who did not contest the council seat in the previous election.
Local authorities that, according to 1971 Census, were below (above) the mean in terms population
born in a Commonwealth country are considered localities with a low (high) minority share. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the local authority-decade level. Sample includes all
interracial elections in years 1973-2014. All regressions include a dummy for BME running with




Inter-religious Attitudes in a
Muslim Country: Evidence from
Indonesia
3.1 Introduction
One strand of literature in the economics of religion investigates the relationship be-
tween economic development and religiosity. In particular, the secularisation hypoth-
esis predicts that economic development leads to decreased religiosity by increasing
education and income.1 In this context, our paper contributes to this literature by
considering the impact of an understudied factor: how the exposure to secular, com-
mercial television affects individuals’ religious identity and behaviour. Individuals’
religion and religiosity affects social behaviour in many secular settings, including
subjective well-being, physical and mental health outcomes, relationships and sex-
ual behaviour, crime and delinquency as well as occupational choices.2 How media
affects religious behaviours is an especially important question for developing coun-
1The economist Jacob Viner defined secularisation as “a lessening of the influence on ethical and
economic thought of ecclesiastical authority and traditional church creeds, and a shifting of weight
from dogma and revelation and other-worldliness to reason and sentiment and considerations of
temporal welfare” (Viner as quoted in Oslington (2003), p. 159).
2See Iannaccone (1998), Hoffman (2013) and Iyer (2016) for surveys.
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tries which, over the last decades, have experienced a dramatic increase in access to
television.
This paper uses detailed survey data on individuals’ self-reported religious sen-
timent and religious practices, as well as attitudes towards people of different faith in
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. Hence, to recover a causal effect
of exposure to television, the paper uses a popular instrumental variable strategy
that exploits the exogenous variation in TV reception across Indonesian sub-districts
given by geomorphological obstacles of the terrain.
The effect of exposure to secular television is not a priori obvious. On the one
hand, being located in areas exposed to secular television can make religion a less
salient aspect of an individual’s identity. Furthermore, role models portrayed in the
programmes may influence viewer preferences over their life-style (LaFerrara et al.
(2012)). On the other hand, exposure to secular content may instigate a backlash
leading to increased religiosity.3 The impact of media may also be negligible, it were
the case that only (already) non-religious individuals consume secular television (Du-
rante and Night (2012)). In addition to this “content effect”, exposure to media can
also have a “time displacement effect” (DellaVigna and LaFerrara (2015)). Increased
television reception leads to more time spent in front of the television screen that
crowds out other types of activity, such as social activities (Olken (2009)). Religious
activities may therefore be displaced by the time spent watching television, so having
negative effects on religiosity.
Our analysis provides three main insights. First, individuals exposed to a higher
number of television channels are less likely to be very religious and report a lower
frequency of religious practices. Second, higher exposure to television decreases inter-
faith hostility. Third, higher exposure to television increases the supply of forbidden
activities at the village level, such as the presence of commercial sex places and
gambling. The paper also investigates whether higher exposure to television affects
3 For example, Fouka (2016) finds that a language policy meant to facilitate the assimilation of
immigrant children heightened their sense of cultural identity. Carvalho (2012) provides a theoretical
model with the aim of explaining veiling amongst Muslim women and determining the effects of
policies regulating veiling. His model predicts that veiling is highest among women from highly
religious communities who interact in irreligious environments, i.e. when temptations are higher. As
possible test of the mechanism, he suggests that veiling could rise at the neighbourhood level with
the introduction of television.
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political preferences towards religious candidates and parties, but it finds little evi-
dence of this effect.
This paper relates to three main streams of literature: the impact of media on
socio-economic behaviours; identity manipulation; and the determinants of religious
sentiment. The literature on the impact of media on social and economic outcomes
has been reviewed recently in DellaVigna and LaFerrara (2015). These outcomes
include fertility preferences and gender norms (LaFerrara et al. (2012); Jensen and
Oster (2009)), inter-ethnic attitudes (DellaVigna et al. (2014), Blouin and Mukand
(2018)) and inter-cultural attitudes (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004)). Olken (2009)
and Fasani and Ferre’ (2013) focus on the effect of television in the Indonesian context,
the former showing that increased exposure to television decreases social capital and
the latter demonstrating that it decreases the probability of migration.
This paper also relates to a flourishing literature in economics that focuses on
identity formation and manipulation. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) semi-
nal papers introduce the idea that identity (a person’s sense of self) affects economic
outcomes, providing examples ranging from gender discrimination in the workplace
to the economics of poverty and social exclusion. Both applied and theoretical works
enriched this literature, increasingly providing evidence that identity plays a crucial
role in individuals’ economic behaviours (Bisin et al. (2010), David Austen-Smith
(2005), Bertrand et al. (2015)). Within this context, Benjamin et al. (2010) and
Benjamin et al. (2016) extend Akerlof’s work by providing theoretical and experi-
mental evidence on how the salience of group identity influences people’s choices. In
particular, in a lab experiment Benjamin et al. (2016) show that, when religious iden-
tity is temporarily primed, individuals’ actions are closer to the behaviour prescribed
by their religion.
The third stream of literature related to this paper investigates the determi-
nants of religious sentiment.4 Exploiting a quasi-experiment, Buser (2015) examines
the effect of income on religiosity in Ecuador, finding that households with higher
incomes have a higher church attendance. Higher income may increase the util-
ity of participating in church activities by increasing status within the community,
4See Iyer (2016) for a comprehensive survey of the state of the art in research in economics of
religion.
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possibly through donations. Chen (2010) examines how the Asian financial crisis
has affected religious participation in Indonesia, showing that those most negatively
affected by the crisis were more likely to increase their religious participation as
measured through the study of the Koran and Islamic school attendance. He also
demonstrates that religious participation serves as an ex-post social insurance mech-
anism. Several studies examine how education affects religiosity (Becker et al. (2014);
Cesur and Mocan (2014); Gulesci and Meyersson (2013); Hungerman (2014), finding
that increased education reduces religious identification.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides back-
ground information about religion and television in Indonesia. Section 3.3 describes
the data and Section 3.4 illustrates the empirical identification strategy. Section 3.5
presents the main findings on television exposure on religiosity, religious practices and
interfaith attitudes. Section 3.6 presents supporting evidence from a village survey
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background to Religion and Television
Religion in Indonesia
In Indonesia six religions are officially recognised: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism,
Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. Although the Indonesian constitution or
state philosophy, Pancasila, guarantees freedom of religion and worshipping, only
these officially recognized religions can be legally practised. Moreover, atheism is not
recognized, and blasphemy can lead to imprisonment. Islam is the main religion with
88% of Indonesians identifying themselves as being Muslims. This constitutes the
largest Muslim population of any country in the world. The second most prevalent
religion is Christianity with 10% of Indonesians identifying themselves as Catholic
or Protestant. Christianity was introduced and spread throughout the archipelago
by the Dutch when they colonised Indonesia in 1605. Other religions account for
around 2% of the Indonesian population. Of these, Hinduism is widespread in Bali,
where 80% of Indonesian Hindu lives, Buddhism is mostly practised in Jakarta and
Confucianism counts less than 700,000 believers (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3).
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Although Indonesian islands tend to be homogeneous in terms of religion prac-
ticed, there are nonetheless areas where different religions coexist with each other.
This is because the Indonesian Transmigration programme, initiated by Dutch East
Indies government, contributed to the religious diversity of the archipelago by pro-
moting migration of (mainly) Muslim Javanese Indonesians to non-Muslim areas
(Ascher and Mirovitskaya (2016)). Today citizens in western Indonesia are mostly
Muslims but they coexist with a small minority of Christians, whereas, in eastern re-
gions, the Christian population is similar in size or larger than the Muslim population
(Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3). Moreover, the presence of Christianity is found in almost
all major cities of the country, including regions dominated by Muslims (Mujibur
Rahman (2006)), through the establishment and provision of social services such as
schools, universities, hospitals and orphanages. Greater religious diversity has led, in
certain areas such the eastern regions of Poso and Maluku, to religious conflicts that
started after the resignation of President Suhearto (Sidel (2006), Mujibur Rahman
(2006)).
Television Industry
The history of television in Indonesia began in 1962 when the government established
the first public television station Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI). TVRI enjoyed
an official monopoly on television broadcasting for about 30 years during which it
served as a political tool to legitimise the government, build consensus and promote
national identity and cohesion. For this reason, in this period, Suhearto’s New Or-
der imposed strict content restrictions that forbid public television from discussing
potentially divisive issues such as ethnicity, religion, race and social class (Kitley
(2000)).
The monopoly of public television started breaking up at end of the ‘80s. Grad-
ually, five privately owned TV station entered the market, only broadcasting in the
major cities of Jakarta and Surabaya through satellite dishes and cable networks.
In 1993 the government liberalised the broadcasting market even further allowing
commercial channels to broadcast in clear nationwide (Olken (2009)). Since then,
commercial television has become a rapidly booming business and between 2000-
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2002 five new competitors entered the market, bringing to 11 the number of private
and public television stations allowed to broadcast nationally free-to-air (Figure 3.2).
This expansion led to a dramatic increase of television availability throughout the
country. In 2005, 88% of the Indonesian population had reception of at least one
television channel, almost a three-fold increase in comparison to 19935 .
Today television is widespread in Indonesia, where 90% of Indonesians report
watch TV daily (see Table 3.1). Viewing data for 2007 shows that Indonesians spend
about 2 hours and 30 minutes per day watching television (AGB Nielsen (2007)).6
Furthermore, television is the main source of political information and news in general
(Fasani and Ferre’ (2013), Lim (2011)).
Although content restrictions established during the Suhearto’s New Order were
removed in 1998, discussions of potentially sensitive issues such as race, religion
and ethnic issues have been very limited on television (Hollander et al. (2009)).
The removal of such restrictions has spurred internal debates with representatives of
religious organisations dismissing the television industry’s programming as Western
and hedonistic (Kitley (2000), Weintraub (2011), Reporters Without Borders (2003),
Barkin (2014)) due to the lack of religious programmes and content.7. For this reason,
since their entry, private networks have started to offer some religious content by,
for example offering religious programs, usually featuring Muslim clerics discussing
religious issues. However, these programmes account for only about 2% of total
broadcast hours and are often broadcast very early in the morning (typically at 5
am). Nonetheless, public and private televisions today offer mostly commercial and
secularised programmes such as a mix of information, education and entertainment
5According to the Census of Villages data (PODES), about 28% of the villages had reception for
the public television channel in 1993, while 72% of villages had reception for at least one television
channel in 2005.
6Nielsen data cover only the nine major Indonesian cities. Older figures from SUSENAS, repre-
sentative for the whole country, indicate an average watching of 1h45 minutes in 1997. Olken (2009)
reports that Indonesians spend on average 2h in 2003 (Jawa only). People with lower socio-economic
status tend to spend more time in front of the screen, particularly at prime time. Consistently, the
higher the education level, the lower the viewing level. Housewives and youngsters (5-15 years old)
appear to be the segment with the longest time spent watching TV (respectively, 3 hours 15 minutes
and 3 hours) (AGB Nielsen (2007)).
7Many broadcast programs still experience friction with Islamic values (Hollander et al. (2009)).
In 2006, the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars issued a fatwa arguing that the popular infor-
mation/entertainment programs were forbidden from the Islamic juridical standpoint (Sofjan and
Hidayati (2013)). Islamist groups have been reported demonstrating, even attacking, TV studios
asking for the cancellation of TV shows if perceived as offensive to religion (Barkin (2014)).
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(Figure 3.3 ).8
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis relies on two data sources: the Indonesia Family Life Survey
(IFLS) and the Census of Indonesian Villages (PODES).
3.3.1 IFLS
The IFLS is an on-going longitudinal survey started in 1993. It collects a rich set of
information on households, the communities they live in and the facilities available
to them. It originally sampled households in 13 Indonesian provinces (out of the
existing 26 in 1993), stratifying on provinces and urban/rural locations and then
randomly sampling within these strata. Subsequent waves re-interviewed the original
households (and all the members older than 15) and tracked individuals who had
moved to another destination within the country. Although the IFLS has a panel
structure, religion and tolerance modules were only introduced in the fourth round,
run in 2007 (IFLS4), where a total of 29,054 adults - defined as household members
15 years or older – in 12,692 households were administered these modules. On top
of basic demographic characteristics and respondents’ religious confession, the IFLS4
includes four types of religious related questions, from which this paper derives the
main dependent variables for the analysis.
8The three major networks, RCTI, SCTV, and INDOSIAR, are in direct competition with one
another; they aim at mainstream content (Hollander et al. (2009)) and only minor differences can
be spotted in their programming strategies. Looking at programme schedules (for example, week
2-8 November 2009, available on http://www.jadwalTVhariini.com, it is clear that Indonesian soap
operas dominate the schedule of major networks between 6pm and 11pm, complemented with occa-
sional reality shows and Asian imported movies. RCTI’s entertainment programmes mainly target
the most affluent audience groups, with drama aired in prime time including “mystery series”, soft
porn and violent shows, while SCTV aims at the younger, more modern audience groups, with talk
shows being the most prominent format. Of the minor networks, TRANS TV offers a mix of In-
donesian reality shows and quizzes, Indonesian movies and Hollywood blockbusters, catering for the
same affluent audience groups as RCTI. The programmes aired are a little riskier than those of its
competitors in terms of portrayed lifestyle, but no risks are taken in political terms (Hollander et al.
(2009)). TRANS7’s prime time show schedule is filled with Indonesian talk shows, soap operas and
comedy shows; ANTV and TPI offer a similar schedule, however broadcasting also movies produced
in the US or Europe. Meanwhile, news entirely dominates METRO schedule; TVONE offers news
and political talk shows too, with occasional reality shows. GLOBAL TV mainly broadcasts im-
ported programmes during prime time (television series or movies either from US, Europe or Asia).
The public network, TVRI, is characterised by a very strong state ideology (Hollander et al. (2009)).
Programmes schedules for TVRI indicate that during prime time it mainly broadcasts news/opinion
programs and cultural programs oriented towards community development.
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First, individuals are asked to rate their level of religiosity. Table 3.4 , panel
a), shows that about 80% of respondents reports being religious or very religious and
that only a very small minority reports not being religious at all.
Second, respondents report their observance of religious practices. Respondents
report whether they consume halal food and praying at least 5 times a day if they
areMuslim; whether they read the Bible and attend the Holy Mass if they are Chris-
tian; whether they follow any dietary restriction and practise meditation if they are
Hindu or Buddhist. Only 8% of respondent are not observant, i.e. they do not follow
the practices prescribed by their religion (Table 3.4, panel b)).
Third, the survey asks a set questions concerning attitudes towards people of
different religions in different situations (whether respondents object to having non
co-religionists live in their village, neighbourhood, or house, whether they would
object if a relative was going to marry a non-co religionist and if people of a different
religion were to build a house of worship in their village). Respondents answer
on a 4-scale measure, from “No objection at all” to “Not acceptable”). Table 3.4,
panel c), shows that respondents oppose more strongly somebody of a different faith
undertaking an action that implies a close, intimate contact (“Somebody of a different
faith marring a close relative or children” is not acceptable by 45% of respondents)
with respect to activities that may imply only a casual encounter (“Somebody of a
different faith moving to your village” is not acceptable by only 2.7% of respondents).
In the main empirical analysis, the variable Hostility is an indicator that takes value
one if the respondent answers that it is Not Acceptable (most negative answer) to
at least one of the previous set of attitudinal questions, whilst Acceptance is an
indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers No objection at all (most
positive answer) to the aforementioned questions at least once.
Fourth, IFLS4 includes a question about the importance of religion and religios-
ity of a candidate when casting a vote. Answers are coded such that the dependent
variable in the regressions takes value one when respondents indicate that the religion
or religiosity of the candidate does not matter to them. Table 3.4, panel d), shows
that candidate’s religion or religiosity does not matter for about one of ouf three
respondents when they are casting their vote. We will use this last variable when
Chapter 3 91
assessing the impact of television exposure to political preferences towards religious
parties and candidates.
Last, a crucial characteristic of the IFLS is that it recodes respondents’ location
in terms of their sub-district of residence at the time of the interview. In this way,
each respondent can be matched with the information about television reception at
the sub-district level. Sub-districts are the lowest administrative units above villages
(on average, each sub-district includes 8 villages/7,000 individuals).
3.3.2 PODES
PODES is the periodic census of Indonesian villages. The 2005 PODES first intro-
duced detailed questions regarding reception of all the existing 11 Indonesian TV
channels. For each TV channel, the head of the village was asked whether there
was a strong enough signal in the village in order to watch the programs clearly
without a satellite dish or cable TV. On average, the 844 Indonesian sub-districts
also covered by IFLS4 receive 7.9 channels out of 11, with a standard deviation of
3.58. Almost all the villages in these sub-districts have clear reception for the public
channel TVRI and for the main networks, while reception of minor networks is less
widespread (Table 3.5).
The 2005 PODES also provides useful information for testing whether exposure
to television affects individual preferences for religiously immoral activities and po-
litical preferences towards religious parties. First, the PODES includes information
on the presence of gambling and “commercial sex activities” in the village - two ac-
tivities forbidden by all major confessions. Second, PODES asks to village heads to
rank the parties by their popularity in the village in 2004 legislative elections. We
build an index of preference for religious parties by computing the share of villages
in a sub-district which ranked a religious party first.
Last, we complement these data with additional information from the 1990
and 1993 PODES, used to construct sub-district level pre-treatment characteristics
(frequency of religious buildings and socio-demographic variables).
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3.4 Identification Strategy
The empirical analysis begins by examining the effect of TV exposure (number of
channels for which there is clear reception in the sub-district) on self-reported reli-
giosity and the observance of religious practices of Indonesian citizens living in the
sub-district. The main specification is the following:
Yisd = α+ βTVsd +Xisdγ + ζGEOsd + δd + uisd (3.1)
where i denotes individuals, s sub-district and d district. The main explanatory
variable, TVsd, captures TV exposure in sub-district s in district d. It measures
the average number of channels received in each sub-district across villages. Xisd is
a set of individual characteristics such as gender, age dummies, confession, level of
education, household log total expenditure and a rural/urban indicator.9 An obvious
threat to the causal interpretation of the parameter β is that TV reception in the
sub-district is not necessarily exogenous. There may be unobserved factors that
affect TV reception and religiosity or inter-religious attitudes simultaneously. For
this reason, the analysis always controls for districts’ fixed effects δd, to capture any
time-invariant characteristics at the district level. Since the topography of a sub-
district may be correlated with unobservable determinants of religious identity, we
include the mean altitude of the villages in the sub-district (GEOsd) as additional
control.
To rule out endogeneity concerns further, a popular instrumental variable strat-
egy is applied. This instrument is based on Indonesia’s mountainous terrain and
was first developed by Olken (2009) and then applied by Enikolopov et al. (2011),
Fasani and Ferre’ (2013) and Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)). The intuition behind this
type of instrument is that once geomorphological and transmitters’ characteristics are
taken into account, the residual variation in TV signal across locations is exogenous
to pre-determined area characteristics. First, using information about the power of
transmitters, their geographical location and the characteristics of the terrain, Olken
9Following Olken (2009) and Fasani and Ferre’ (2013), the three Indonesian major cities Jakarta,
Surabaya and Medan, where private television broadcasting started before 1993, are excluded from
the analysis.
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predicts the average signal strength across channels received at the centroid of each
sub-district (predicted signal strength). This measure captures the intensity of TV re-
ception based both on topography and distance. Second, in order to isolate the pure
effect of topography, he estimates the counter factual predicted signal strength that
one would have obtained had been there a direct line of sight between the transmitter
and sub-districts’ centroids (free space signal strength). Using the former variable as
an instrument for the actual average number of channels received in the sub-district
while controlling for the latter allows to isolate the variation in signal strength that
is due exclusively to geomorphological accidents. The exclusion restriction for this
instrumental variable strategy holds under the reasonable assumption that, once the
other geographical determinants of signal reception are controlled for, geographical
idiosyncrasies have no direct effect on religious outcomes. The paper borrows these
two constructed measures (predicted signal strength and free space signal strength)
from Olken (2009).
3.4.1 Validity of the Identification Strategy
If the identification strategy is valid, then there should be no correlation between
the variation in TV signal and other potential determinants of religious sentiments
measured before TV introduction. To assess this, the validity of the exogeneity
assumption is tested by using available observable pre-determined sub-district char-
acteristics according to the following regression:
ysd = ζ + φPREDICTEDSIGNALsd + ψFREESPACEsd + θGEOsd + δd + vsd
(3.2)
where ysd is a characteristic of sub-district s in district d; PREDICTEDSIGNALsd
and FREESPACEsd are the predicted signal strength and the free-space signal
strength in sub-district s and district d respectively; GEOsd is altitude and δd district
fixed effects. If the exogeneity assumption is correct, we expect φ = 0. Results in
Table 3.6 shows that almost none of the sub-district characteristics measured in
1993 (nor the change between 1990 and 1993) significantly explain signal strength
available about 10 years after, which lends credibility to the identification strategy.
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In particular, none of the religious characteristics measured in the ’90s (number of
mosques, other faith buildings and Islamic praying centres) are correlated with future
signal when district fixed effects are taken into account. None of the sub-district socio-
economic characteristics (population in agriculture, number of social organisations,
literacy rate, electricity rate) are correlated with predicted signal strength. Among
population variables, the number of villages per sub-district in 1993 is correlated
with signal strength. For this reason, in the main regressions, results will always be
presented with and without this sub-district control variable.
Table 3.7 shows the first stage estimates. In all the specifications, the instrument
is significant at any conventional level and the F-statistic is above the conventional
threshold of 10 for strong instruments. This rules out any concern about potential
biases in the second stage due to the use of a weak instruments.
3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Religiosity and Religious Practices
This section explores the effect of exposure to an additional television channel on
religiosity and frequency of religious practices. Table 3.8 shows the estimation results
for alternative specifications of equation (1). Both OLS and IV specifications are
presented. The odd columns control for elevation and free space signal strength; even
columns add district fixed effects and the number of villages per sub-district in 1993.
Standard errors are clustered by sub-district to allow for any possible correlation in
the unobservable characteristics of individuals who live in the same sub-district.
OLS estimates provide little support to the hypothesis that improved television
reception affects religiosity (col (1), (2)).10 However, results from the IV estimates
indicate that reception for an additional channel decreases the probability of self-
describing as very religious or religious by 3 percentage points (col (4)). This effect
is mainly driven by a decrease in the share of people declaring being “religious” with
respect to being “somewhat religious” (not shown).
10A possible reason for OLS estimates being biased towards zero is that PODES question may
imprecisely captures the variation in television reception relevant for actual television watching
decisions, as also observed by Olken (2009).
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Table 3.8, col. (5)-(8) show the effect on increased television reception on the
probability of observing religious practices. The IV estimates suggest that reception
for each additional channel reduces the probability of observing prescribed religious
behaviours by 2 percentage points. Furthermore, by splitting the sample by religion,
it appears that the effect is driven by the majority group (Muslims), rather than by
minority religious groups (Table 3.9, col. (3) and (4) - difference in coefficients is
statistically significant at conventional levels).
3.5.2 Interfaith Attitudes
Having provided evidence that higher exposure to television lowers religious identity
both in terms of self reported religiosity and intensity of religious practices, the paper
now researches whether increased reception affects relationships between people of
different faith.
Table 3.10 shows that increased exposure to television significantly decreases
hostility towards people of a different faith. In particular, in the most demanding IV
specification (col (4)) exposure to an additional TV channel decreases the share of
“haters” (people objecting to people of a different faith on at least one of the attitude
questions) by 13% with respect to the mean. Consistently, the share of people showing
high acceptance towards people of a different faith increases by 25% with respect to
the mean for each additional TV channel with reception in the sub-district (col (8)).
Table 3.11 details how exposure to television influences people’s attitudes to-
wards people of a different faith in different situations. From Panel A to panel E, the
table ranks questions from “less intimate” to “more intimate” situations. There is
no doubt that somebody of a different faith marrying a member of the family implies
a closer contact with respect to somebody of a different faith moving to the village.
Exposure to television seems to influence attitudes on both sides of the spectrum.
More exposure to television makes people less intolerant in the closest type of inter-
faith relationship (Panel E) and more openly acceptant in the less intimate aspect
of inter-faith relationships (Panel A and B). These findings can be interpreted as
individuals becoming increasingly more open as more contact is involved. Hostility
decreases in the most intimate type of contacts, while tolerance reaches its maximum
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when the least intimate type of interfaith contact is involved.
Estimates from Table 3.12 suggest that the effect is driven by Muslim respon-
dents. The difference in estimated coefficients is statistically significant for columns
(3) - (4). In unreported regressions, the paper also examines whether the impact of
TV exposure on interfaith attitudes varies by gender, age or level of education. The
analysis does not find any clear-cut evidence of heterogeneous effects; in fact, the
paper finds only a very modest stronger effect for women with respect to men.
The decrease in religiosity documented in the previous section may contribute
to the change in attitudes. In other words, it cannot be ruled out that the change
in inter-faith tolerance is a consequence of a decrease in religiosity. The psychology
research literature highlighted how religion fosters in-group pro-sociality and out-
group hostility (Hall et al. (2010), Johnson et al. (2010)).11 Religious practice can
also lead to hostility by encouraging religious individuals to remain cloistered in
cohesive homogeneous social groups without exposure to worshippers of different
beliefs.
3.6 Additional Results
Improved television reception can have consequences on outcomes beyond religios-
ity and inter-faith attitudes by affecting individual preferences towards religiously
immoral activities and political preferences towards religious candidates and par-
ties. The next sub-sections explore these possibilities. First, the paper investigates
whether there is a lower presence of gambling and prostitution, both activities largely
condemned by Islam and the other religions, in sub-districts with better reception
with respect to villages with worse reception. Second, the paper examines individ-
ual preferences towards religious candidates and voting for religious parties at the
aggregate level.
11Also called parochial altruism, this paradox was first expressed by the influential psychologist
Gordon Allport (1955)
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3.6.1 Forbidden Economic Activities
Religion is often considered the backbone of a society’s morality. How individuals
value some actions (i.e. their preferences over these actions) may be influenced by
their own degree of religiosity12. This section therefore analyses whether television
reception influences preferences towards two types of activities considered immoral
according to most confessions and for which information can be found in PODES,
namely gambling and prostitution. Gambling is forbidden by all the major confes-
sions13, as well as extramarital sex. The intuition is that if exposure to television
shifts viewers’ preferences towards these activities, there will be a higher demand for
them in sub-districts with better reception, and therefore in equilibrium also higher
supply.
Consistently, Table 3.13 , col (1)-(4), shows that, in sub-districts exposed to a
higher number of television channels, gambling is present in a higher share of villages.
Reception for each additional channel leads to an increase in the share of villages with
gambling of 3.7 percentage points in the most demanding IV specification. Similarly,
col. (5)-(8) show that increased exposure to television leads to an increase in the
share of villages where places of commercial sex are found. Estimates from the most
demanding IV specification indicates that reception for each additional TV channel
increases the share of villages with commercial sex places by 1 percentage point.14
3.6.2 Political Preferences
Exposure to a secular television can also potentially affect the political preferences of
Indonesians towards religious candidates or parties with a religious platform. Identity
of elected politicians matters in terms of socio-economic outcomes (Bhalotra et al.
(2014)) and can drive favouritism (Burgess et al. (2015)). Furthermore, Banerjee
12Benjamin et al. (2010) provides a useful theoretical model to study how saliency of identity
affects individual behaviour in terms of respecting/deviating from the norm dictated by the group.
13 Hoffmann (2000) provides a summary of the gambling views of major religious denominations
in the U.S. While from the Qur’an: “O believers, wine and gambling, idols and divining arrows are
an abhorrence, the work of Satan. So keep away from it, that you may prevail. Satan only desires
to arouse discord and hatred among you with wine and gambling, and to deter you from the mention
of God and from prayer. Will you desist?” Qur’an, Sura 5:90-91 (Al-Ma’ida)
14When a similar analysis is performed including all the sub-districts in IFLS4 provinces, and not
just the IFLS4 sub-districts sample, the result on commercial sex places is not robust (Table A.2 in
the Appendix).
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and Pande (2007) suggest that stronger voter ethnicisation, i.e. a greater preference
for the party representing one’s ethnic group, reduces the quality of government.
The role of media in shaping political outcomes has been extensively studied in
the economic literature (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Enikolopov et al. (2011),
DellaVigna et al. (2014) and Durante et al. (2017)), especially when captured by the
political elite itself.
Results in Table 3.14 indicate that, overall, exposure to television does not shift
preferences away from religious candidates (col. (1)-(4)), nor makes the religious
denomination of a candidate a less salient trait (col. (5)-(8)). However, when focusing
on the non-Muslim sub-sample (Table 3.15, col. (2) and (4)), each additional channel
increases by 8.9% the probability that the level of religiosity of a candidate does not
matter and by 7.8% the probability that the religious denomination of a candidate
does not matter to the respondent. One possible explanation for this finding is
that Muslim candidates respond to the decreased religiosity of the Muslim electorate
by lessening this aspect of their identity in their campaigns for local elections in
localities with increased television reception. As a consequence, non-Muslim voters
may then increasingly perceive that the religious identity of a candidate matters less.
Another possibility is that increased reception allows non-Muslim voters to know
Muslim candidates better and to go beyond religious cleavages in voting. Christian
newspapers often emphasise how Islamist politicians are moving to the centre of the
political spectrum, downplaying divisive issues of faith and supporting programs to
help the poor or fight corruption.15
Unfortunately, the IFLS4 does not include any information about respondents’
actual voting behaviour or intentions. A proxy for preferences for religious voting
can be extracted from PODES, that, in the 2005 wave, asks to village heads to rank
the parties by their popularity in the village in 2004 legislative elections. Of the
24 political parties that contested the election, eight parties have direct or partial
affiliation with a religion.16 Nationally, parties with direct or partial affiliation with
15See for example Vatican Insider News (April 21, 2017) or Christian Science Monitor (April 9,
2009)
16The following parties have direct or partial affiliation to Islam: the Indonesian Nahdlatul Com-
munity Party (PPNUI, Partai Persatuan Nahdatul Ummah Indonesia), the Prosperous Justice Party
(PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), the Moon and Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang), the United
Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the National Awakening Party (Partai
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Islamic organizations received about 39 percent of the vote, while the only Christian
party received less than 2 percent of the vote (U.S. Department of State (2004)).
Table 3.16 shows that the share of villages in a sub-district ranking a religious party
first (col (1)-(4)) is not affected by television reception in the sub-district. The second
panel of the table (col (5)-(8)) shows that reception has no impact on the share of
villages in a sub-district ranking a religious party among the first five.17
3.7 Conclusions
This paper documents the effect of television exposure on religious identity and inter-
faith attitudes in Indonesia. The identification strategy is based on the variation in
the number of television channels available, purely generated by geographic idiosyn-
crasies of the terrain.
The paper finds a strong negative effect on individuals religiosity and observance
of religious practices. Exposure to an additional channel reduces the probability of
individuals reporting being very religious by 3.7% and reduces the probability of
observing religious practices of 2.3% Consistently with this effect, exposure to an
additional TV channel reduces hostility and increases open acceptance of contacts
with people of different faith. Furthermore, the paper suggests that television expo-
sure increases the demand for religiously immoral activities - meaning gambling and
prostitution. Reception of an additional TV channel in a sub-district increases the
proportion of villages in which gambling takes place by 5.6% and the proportion of
villages with commercial sex places of 33%. The paper also investigate the effects
of the media on political preference and voting outcomes. It analyses whether expo-
sure to television shifts voters away from religious candidates and religious parties.
Results do not support this hypothesis. However, non-Muslim respondent, when ex-
posed to a higher number of television channels, appear to have a higher probability
of not giving importance to the religion and religiosity of a candidate in an election
Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional),
the Star of Reform Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or PBR). Only the Prosperous Peace Party
(PDS) has an openly Christian orientation. No party representing another religion competed.
17Results do not change if the Christian party is excluded, or whether the definition of Islamic
party is restricted to parties whose official platform in 1998 called for Islamic law as the basis of
the Indonesian state (PPNUI, PKS, PBB, PPP). Extending the analysis to all subdistricts in IFLS4
provinces does not affect the results (Table A.3 in the Appendix).
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(respectively 7.8% and 8.9% with respect to the mean).
These results suggest that the media possess a substantial power in shaping the
religious identity of a country, especially when captured by a political elite which has
an interest in lessening the saliency of a potentially divisive issue such as religion.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Share of Muslim population by province
Note: 2010 Indonesian Census. Share of Muslim population by province. Protestantism is the
dominant religion in Papua and North Sulawesi, whilst most of the population in East Nusa Tenggara
are Roman Catholics. Hinduism is widely practised in Bali, where 80% of Indonesia Hindu people
live. Buddhism is mostly practised around Jakarta by Chinese Indonesians and some indigenous
Javanese people. Provinces covered by IFLS and included in the analysis: North Sumatra, Riau,
South Sumatra, Lampung, West Java, Central Jawa, DI Yogyakarta, North Java, Bali, West Nusa
Tenggara, Sud Sulawesi
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Figure 3.2: TV time-line
Source: Hollander et al. (2009), Olken (2009)
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Figure 3.3: Broadcast hours and time spent watching by type of program
Source: AGB Nielsen (2007)
Chapter 3 104
3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Percentage of population and media related activities
% Population who ... 1997 2003 2006 2009
Watched a television program in the last week 77 85 86 90
Listened radio broadcasting in the last week 53 50 40 24
Read a magazine/newspaper in the last week 11 25 23 21
Accessed internet in the last 3 months . . 4 11
Notes: National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) microdata, 1997. Sample restricted to individ-
uals aged 10 years old or older.
Table 3.2: TV networks’ market shares
Network Market Share (%) Network Market Share (%)
RCTI 19.0 GLOBAL TV 5.1
SCTV 17.3 LATIVI 4.5
INDOSIAR 14.2 ANTV 4.2
TPI 12.6 METRO 1.9
TRANSTV 12.1 TVRI 1.4
TV7 6.4 Other 1.3
Note: Market share calculated by AGB Nielsen as reported by Hollander et al. (2009). “Other”
category refers to local TV stations. Nielsen market research only covers the metropolitan areas,
therefore is likely to underestimate TVRI market share.
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Table 3.3: Religions in Indonesia in IFLS4
Prov. code Prov. Muslim Christian Other
12 North Sumatra 60.43 39.56 0.00
14 Riau 82.00 18.0 0.00
16 South Sumatra 95.23 2.51 2.26
18 Lampung 99.15 0.73 0.12
32 West Java 98.81 1.04 0.15
33 Central Java 98.62 1.33 0.03
34 DI Yogyakarta 89.78 10.71 0.16
35 East Java 98.22 1.67 0.12
51 Bali 12.98 2.25 84.77
52 West Nusa Tenggara 98.44 0.24 1.32
73 South Sulawesi 75.09 12.54 12.36
Total 93.11 3.71 3.18
Note: The category “Christian” includes both Catholic and Protestant. The category “Other”
includes Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian. Provinces for which we have sub-districts with complete
data religiosity and TV reception.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics: dependent variables from IFLS4
Panel a) How religious are you? (%)
Not religious Somewhat religious Religious Very religious
2.40 15.45 76.30 5.85
Panel b) How observant? (%)
Not observant Observant
8.19 91.81
Panel c) How do you feel if someone with different faith from you ... (%)
Not acceptable Somewhat acceptable No obj. No obj.at all
Lives in your village? 2.68 21.77 72.22 3.34
Lives in your neighbourhood? 3.80 22.89 70.39 2.92
Builds a house of worship
in your community 18.15 42.44 36.87 2.54
Rents a room from you? 11.67 35.45 51.09 1.79
Marries one of your close
relatives or children? 45.118 32.46 21.07 1.29
Panel d) Political candidate’s characteristics do not matter (%)
Religiosity does not matter 32.31
Religion does not matter 35.44
Notes: Share of respondent and answers for each question. In panel c), attitudes-related questions
are ranked by “intimacy of contact”, from the least intimate to the most intimate type of contact.
In original survey, the order of the question is very similar, but the question related to building a
house of worship in the community comes last.
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Table 3.5: Reception by channel
Network Obs Mean Sd Min Max
TVRI 844 0.91 0.23 0 1
RCTI 844 0.85 0.34 0 1
SCTV 844 0.83 0.34 0 1
INDOSIAR 844 0.83 0.35 0 1
TRANS 844 0.72 0.42 0 1
TPI 844 0.73 0.40 0 1
ANTV 844 0.71 0.40 0 1
METRO 844 0.66 0.43 0 1
TV7 844 0.62 0.45 0 1
LATIVI 844 0.54 0.47 0 1
GLOBAL 844 0.50 0.45 0 1
Average #channels
in subdistrict 844 7.90 3.58 0 11
Note: The table displays the average share of villages with clear reception for each television channel.
Only subdistricts covered by IFLS4 are included. Last line displays the average number of channels
for which there is clear reception in Indonesian subdistricts covered by IFLS4.
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Table 3.6: Balance test
(1) (2)
OLS OLS with controls
Independent variable: obs. mean Signal R2 Signal R2
Mosques (level ’93) 851 5.635 -0.022** 0.125 -0.004 0.704
(0.010) (0.009)
Mosques (change ’90-’93) 851 0.303 -0.000 0.004 0.003 0.376
(0.001) (0.004)
Islamic praying rooms (level ’93) 851 14.19 0.041 0.054 0.004 0.734
(0.027) (0.027)
Islamic praying rooms (change ’90-’93) 851 1.329 -0.005 0.001 0.019 0.291
(0.019) (0.025)
Other religious buildings (level ’93) 851 0.625 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.694
(0.003) (0.003)
Other religious buildings (change ’90-’93) 851 0.679 -0.003 0.003 0.004 0.222
(0.009) (0.013)
Pop in agriculture (share ’93) 851 0.634 -0.000 0.298 -0.001 0.558
(0.000) (0.001)
N social organizations (level ’93) 851 3.448 0.001 0.063 0.000 0.598
(0.001) (0.001)
Electricity rate (share ’93) 851 0.478 0.000 0.282 0.001 0.622
(0.001) (0.001)
Literacy rate (share ’93) 851 0.871 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.284
(0.000) (0.000)
N villages (level ’93) 851 17.87 -0.004 0.045 0.069* 0.635
(0.021) (0.035)
Avg. pop in villages (level ’93) 851 8.193 0.001 0.106 0.001 0.533
(0.001) (0.001)
Notes: each obs. is a sub-district (admin. boundaries 1990). Each line reports result from a
different regression, in which signal strength is the dependent variable. Specifically, col. (1) reports
the coefficient, standard error and R2 of the univariate OLS regression of each variable on the
intensity of signal controlling for free space signal strength and elevation. Column (2) adds district
fixed effects. Observations weighted per population size (1993) with the exception of population
regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: First stage
(1) (2) (3)
TVchannels TVchannels TVchannels
Avg signal strength 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.031***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 17,980 17,980 17,980
R-squared 0.596 0.911 0.911
Free space signal yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes
District fe yes yes
N villages 1993 yes
Indiv contr yes yes yes
N of clusters 844 844 844
F-stat 21.17 18.02 18.33
F-stat P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: First stage regression. Individual controls: education dummies, gender, age categories dum-
mies, religion dummies, log household expenditure, dummy for the village being urban or rural.
Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. ***p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table 3.8: Religiosity and religious practices (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Religiosity Observance
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels 0.005 -0.000 -0.013 -0.030* -0.001 0.002 -0.019*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Obs 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980
R-squared 0.051 0.116 0.038 0.042 0.156 0.193 0.021 0.029
Mean dep var 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.0819 0.0819 0.918 0.918
Free space signal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
The dependent variable in col 1-4 is a dummy for self reported religiosity = religious or very religious
(0 for somewhat religious and not religious); the dependent variable in col 5-8 is a dummy that takes
value one when the respondent observes religious practices (being a Muslim, he/she consumes halal
food and pray at least 5 times a day; being a Christian reads the bible and attend the holy mass;
being a Hindu or Buddhist , does have any dietary restriction and practises meditation. TVchannels
is the number of channels for which there is clear reception in the subdistrict; in IV estimates, it is
instrumented with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section ??
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Table 3.9: Religiosity and religious practices (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Religiosity Observance
Muslim Non Muslim Muslim Non Muslim
IV IV IV IV
TV channels -0.031 0.000 -0.027*** 0.002
(0.020) (0.017) (0.009) (0.013)
Obs 15,895 2,085 15,895 2,085
R-squared 0.042 0.052 -0.004 0.117
Mean dep var 0.183 0.113 0.935 0.686
Free space signal yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p <
0.1; Even columns refer to the Muslim respondents subsample; odd columns to non-Muslims. The
dependent variable in col (1) and (2) is a dummy for self reported religiosity = religious or very
religious (0 for somewhat religious and not religious); The dependent variable in col (3) and (4) is a
dummy that takes value when the respondent observes religious practices (being a Muslim, he/she
consumes halal food and pray at least 5 times a day; being a Christian reads the bible and attend the
holy mass; being a Hindu or Buddhist , does have any dietary restriction and practises meditation.
TVchannels is the number of channels for which there is clear reception in the subdistrict; in IV
estimates, it is instrumented with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section ??
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Table 3.10: Attitudes (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hostility Acceptance
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels -0.007 0.006 -0.035 -0.065* -0.002 -0.001 0.007** 0.016**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.022) (0.035) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980
R-squared 0.178 0.178 -0.008 -0.007 0.009 0.064 -0.001 -0.001
Mean dep var 0.052 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.0642 0.0642 0.0642 0.0642
Free space signal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
The dependent variable in col (1)-(4) Hostility is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent
answers that it is Not Acceptable (most negative answer) if somebody of a different faith lives in
the village, lives in the neighbourhood, rents a room from you, marries somebody in your family
or builds a house of worship in the community at least once. The dependent variable in col (5)-
(8) Acceptance is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers No objection at all
(most positive answer) to the aforementioned questions at least once. TVchannels is the number
of channels for which there is clear reception in the subdistrict; in IV estimates, it is instrumented
with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section 3.4. Individual controls: education
dummies, gender, age categories dummies, religion dummies, log household expenditure, dummy for
the village being urban or rural.
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Table 3.11: Attitudes, detailed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hostility Acceptance
IV IV
Panel A: wrt villagers
TV channels 0.003 0.007 0.010** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
R-squared -0.002 0.001 -0.011 0.001
Mean dep var 0.0268 0.0268 0.0334 0.0334
Panel B: wrt neighbours
TV channels 0.000 0.004 0.008* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
R-squared 0.002 0.004 -0.008 0.003
Mean dep var 0.0380 0.0380 0.0292 0.0292
Panel C: wrt own house
TV channels -0.014 -0.014 0.006* 0.004
(0.009) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003)
R-squared 0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.002
Mean dep var 0.117 0.117 0.0179 0.0179
Panel D: wrt own family
TV channels -0.037* -0.062** 0.001 0.003
(0.021) (0.031) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared -0.008 -0.003 0.000 0.002
Mean dep var 0.452 0.452 0.0129 0.0129
Panel E: wrt religious buildings
TV channels -0.006 -0.043 -0.002 0.006
(0.008) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004)
R-squared 0.008 -0.003 0.005 0.004
Mean dep var 0.182 0.182 0.0254 0.0254
Observations 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980
Free space signal yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
Each panel refers to an attitudinal question: what do you think if somebody of a different faith
lives in the village (Panel A)), lives in the neighbourhood (Panel B)), builds a house of worship in
the community (Panel C)), rents a room from you (Panel D)), marries somebody in your family
(Panel E)). The dependent variable in col (1)-(2) Hostility is an indicator that takes value one if the
respondent answers that it is Not Acceptable (most negative answer). The dependent variable in col
(3)-(4) Acceptance is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers No objection at all
(most positive answer). TVchannels is the number of channels for which there is clear reception in
the subdistrict; it is instrumented with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section
3.4.
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Table 3.12: Attitudes (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hostility Acceptance
Muslim Non Muslim Muslim Non Muslim
IV IV IV IV
TV channels -0.072* -0.020 0.017** 0.009
(0.039) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010)
Obs 15,895 2,085 15,895 2,085
R-squared -0.018 -0.001 -0.002 0.034
Mean dep var 0.529 0.108 0.0608 0.110
Free space signal yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
The dependent variable in col (1)-(2) Hostility is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent
answers that it is Not Acceptable (most negative answer) if somebody of a different faith lives in
the village, lives in the neighbourhood, rents a room from you, marries somebody in your family
or builds a house of worship in the community at least once. The dependent variable in col (3)-
(4) Acceptance is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers No objection at all
(most positive answer) to the aforementioned questions at least once. TVchannels is the number
of channels for which there is clear reception in the subdistrict; in IV estimates, it is instrumented
with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section 3.4. Individual controls: education
dummies, gender, age categories dummies, religion dummies, log household expenditure, dummy for
the village being urban or rural.
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Table 3.13: Forbidden economic activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gambling Prostitution
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels 0.017*** 0.022** 0.052*** 0.037* 0.001 0.002 0.006*** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
Mean dep var 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.0328 0.0328 0.0328 0.0328
R-squared 0.031 0.386 -0.033 0.010 0.018 0.170 -0.009 -0.014
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Free space signal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
Each observation is a sub-district covered by IFLS, 1990 boundaries. Observations are weighted for
population size in 1993. The dependent variable in col (1)-(6) Gambling is the share of villages in
which gambling is present in the sub-district. The dependent variable in col (7)-(12) Gambling the
share of villages in the sub-district in which prostitution is present in the sub-district. TVchannels
is the number of channels for which there is clear reception in the sub-district; in IV estimates, it is
instrumented with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section ??
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Table 3.14: Political preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Candidate’s religiosity does not matter Candidate’s religion does not matter
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels 0.014** 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.015** 0.000 0.022 -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.020) (0.013)
Observations 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980 17,980
R-squared 0.032 0.144 0.009 0.010 0.052 0.184 0.010 0.018
Mean dep var 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354
Free space signal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1.
The dependent variable in col (1)-(4) is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers
that the religiosity of a candidate does not matter in an election (alternative answers: It makes it
very unlikely/unlikely/somewhat likely/very likely to vote for him). The dependent variable in col
(5)-(8) is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers that a candidates’ religion
does not matter in an election (alternative answers: It makes it very unlikely/unlikely/somewhat
likely/very likely to vote for him). TVchannels is the number of channels for which there is clear
reception in the subdistrict; in IV estimates, it is instrumented with the average predicted signal
strength as described in Section 3.4. Individual controls: education dummies, gender, age categories
dummies, religion dummies, log household expenditure, dummy for the village being urban or rural.
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Table 3.15: Political preferences (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Candidate’s religiosity Candidate’s religion
does not matter does not matter
Muslim Non Muslim Muslim Non Muslim
IV IV IV IV
TVchannels -0.010 0.052** -0.011 0.055**
(0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.025)
Observations 15,895 2,085 15,895 2,085
R-squared 0.005 0.024 0.008 0.026
Mean dep var 0.304 0.583 0.329 0.708
Free space signal yes yes yes yes
District fe yes yes yes yes
Individual contrs yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
The dependent variable in col (1)-(2) is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers
that the religiosity of a candidate does not matter in an election (alternative answers: It makes it
very unlikely/unlikely/somewhat likely/very likely to vote for him). The dependent variable in col
(3)-(4) is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent answers that a candidates’ religion
does not matter in an election (alternative answers: It makes it very unlikely/unlikely/somewhat
likely/very likely to vote for him). Odd columns restricts to the Muslim subsample; even columns
to respondents of other confessions. TVchannels is the number of channels for which there is clear
reception in the subdistrict; in IV estimates, it is instrumented with the average predicted signal
strength as described in Section 3.4. Individual controls: education dummies, gender, age categories
dummies, religion dummies, log household expenditure, dummy for the village being urban or rural.
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Table 3.16: Voting for religious parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Religious party top 1 Religious party top 5
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels 0.010** -0.009* 0.030*** 0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004)
Obs 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
Mean dep var 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954
R-squared 0.023 0.587 -0.006 0.032 0.022 0.808 0.018 -0.011
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Free space signal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
N villages 1993 yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
Each observation is a sub-district covered by IFLS, 1990 boundaries. Observations are weighted for
population size in 1993. The dependent variable in col (1)-(6) is the share of villages in the sub-
district in which a religious party ranked first in the 2004 elections. The dependent variable in col
(7)-(12) is the share of villages in the sub-district in which a religious party ranked among the first 5
parties in the 2004 elections. Religious parties are listed in section 3.6.2. TVchannels is the number
of channels for which there is clear reception in the sub-district; in IV estimates, it is instrumented




Table A.1: Balance test, all sub-districts in IFLS4 provinces
(1) (2)
OLS OLS with controls
Independent variable: obs. mean Signal R2 Signal R2
Mosques (level ’93) 1,989 5.301 -0.027*** 0.125 -0.006 0.652
(0.007) (0.005)
Mosques (change ’90-’93) 1,989 0.290 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.174
(0.001) (0.002)
Islamic praying rooms (level ’93) 1,989 14.18 0.023 0.026 -0.022 0.750
(0.028) (0.023)
Islamic praying rooms (change ’90-’93) 1,989 1.631 -0.017 0.004 -0.004 0.138
(0.011) (0.017)
Other religious buildings (level ’93) 1,989 0.625 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.694
(0.003) (0.003)
Other religious buildings (change ’90-’93) 1,989 0.749 0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.108
(0.006) (0.008)
Pop in agriculture (share ’93) 1,989 0.714 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.574
(0.000) (0.000)
N social organizations (level ’93) 1,989 3.372 0.002*** 0.095 -0.000 0.559
(0.001) (0.001)
Electricity rate (share ’93) 1,989 0.390 -0.000 0.341 -0.001 0.636
(0.000) (0.000)
Literacy rate (share ’93) 1,989 0.852 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.315
(0.000) (0.000)
N villages (level ’93) 1,989 16.74 -0.027** 0.049 0.021 0.564
(0.012) (0.017)
Avg. pop in villages (level ’93) 1,989 6906 23.359 0.008 31.783 0.098
(18.464) (35.705)
Notes: each obs. is a subdistrict (admin. boundaries 1990). Each line reports result from a different
regression, in which signal strength is the dependent variable. Specifically, col. (1) reports the
coefficient, standard error and R2 of the univariate OLS regression of each variable on the intensity
of signal controlling for for free space signal strength and elevation, elevation square and cubic and
distance to the district capital (km) Even columns add district fixed effects, while column (2) adds
subdistricts fixed effects. Observations weighted per population size (1993) with the exception of
population regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.2: Forbidden economic activities, all sub-districts in IFLS4 provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gambling Prostitution
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.037*** 0.029** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989
Mean dep var 0.628 0.628 0.628 0.628 0.0262 0.0262 0.0262 0.0262
R-squared 0.028 0.352 -0.006 0.015 0.007 0.160 -0.006 0.008
Free space yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District FE yes yes yes yes
Elevation ˆ2, ˆ3 yes yes yes yes
Dist. from capital yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
Each observation is a sub-district in a province covered by IFLS, 1990 boundaries. Observations are
weighted for population size in 1993. The dependent variable in col (1)-(4) Gambling is the share
of villages in which gambling is present in the sub-district. The dependent variable in col (5)-(8)
Prostitution the share of villages in the sub-district in which prostitution is present in the sub-district.
TV channels is the number of channels for which there is clear reception in the sub-district; in IV
estimates, it is instrumented with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section 3.4.
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Table A.3: Voting for religious parties, all sub-districts in IFLS provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Religious party top 1 Religious party top 5
OLS IV OLS IV
TV channels 0.015*** -0.003 0.035*** 0.012 0.002* 0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989
Mean dep var 0.263 0.222 0.263 0.222 0.963 0.947 0.963 0.947
R-squared 0.022 0.621 0.020 0.000 0.014 0.801 0.011 -0.004
Elevation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sub-district FE yes yes yes yes
Elevation ˆ2, ˆ3 yes yes yes yes
Distance from capital yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust SE in parenthesis, clustered at sub-district level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p < 0.1;
Each observation is a sub-district covered by IFLS, 1990 boundaries. Observations are weighted
for population size in 1993. The dependent variable in col (1)-(4) is the share of villages in the
sub-district in which a religious party ranked first in the 2004 legislative elections. The dependent
variable in col (5)-(8) is the share of villages in the sub-district in which a religious party ranked
among the first 5 parties in the 2004 elections. Religious parties is listed in section 3.6.2. TVchannels
is the number of channels for which there is clear reception in the sub-district; in IV estimates, it is
instrumented with the average predicted signal strength as described in Section 3.4
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